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Reforming the Regulation of
Community Banks After Dodd-Frank
TANYA D. MARSH*
The regulatory framework for financial institutions in the United States imposes
significant costs on community banks without providing benefits to consumers or the
economy that justify those costs. The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act builds on decades of “one-size-fits-all” regulation of financial
institutions, an ill-conceived regulatory strategy that puts community banks at a
competitive disadvantage as compared with their larger, more complex competitors.
The imposition of regulatory burdens on community banks without attendant benefits
ultimately harms both consumers and the economy by (1) forcing community banks to
consolidate or go out of business, furthering the concentration of assets in a small
number of megafinancial institutions; and (2) encouraging standardization of
financial products, leaving millions of vulnerable borrowers without meaningful
access to credit. Neither of these outcomes will protect consumers, the financial
system, or the recovery of the American economy. Instead, radical reform of the
existing regulatory structure is necessary to ensure the future of community banks.
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INTRODUCTION
A cascade of financial institution failures in September 2008 marked the
beginning of the worst financial crisis since the Great Depression.1 In his memoir,

* Associate Professor of Law, Wake Forest University School of Law, WinstonSalem, North Carolina. Many thanks to Peter Wallison, Sid Shapiro, and Arthur Wilmarth
for their comments and contributions. The valuable input of research assistants Daniel
Gibson, J. Austen Irrobali, Sean Radler, and W. Nicolas Harper, was much appreciated. I am
particularly indebted to Joseph W. Norman. Some of this research was presented at the 2013
Community Banking in the 21st Century Conference at the Federal Reserve Bank of St.
Louis, hosted by the Federal Reserve and the Conference of State Bank Supervisors.
1. See Andrew Ross Sorkin, A Bailout Above the Law, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 23, 2008, at C1.

180

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 90:179

Timothy Geithner2 used the metaphor of a neighborhood on fire to describe both
the 2008 financial crisis and the policy response to it. He noted that some critics
objected to the perceived bailout of “troubled firms” because they thought that
bailouts “rewarded the arsonists who set the system on fire.”3 Indeed, those who
were concerned about moral hazard reasoned that “[i]f you rescue pyromaniacs,
you’ll end up with more fires.”4 Although Geithner conceded that those were “valid
concerns,” he argued that “the truly moral thing to do during a raging financial
inferno is to put it out. The goal should be to protect the innocent, even if some of
the arsonists escape their full measure of justice.”5 He referred to President
Obama’s argument that you “shouldn’t refuse to deploy fire engines to a burning
neighborhood in order to highlight the dangers of smoking in bed.”6
If the 2008 financial crisis was a burning neighborhood, with homes
representing banks and other financial institutions, then there were a handful of
homeowners who surrounded themselves with kindling and then fell asleep holding
a burning cigarette7—Lehman Brothers, Countrywide Financial, Bear Stearns,
Merrill Lynch, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, American International Group (AIG),
Citigroup, and Bank of America.8 Secretary Geithner and other leading policy
makers in the Bush and Obama administrations worried that the failure of any of
these “huge, far-flung, overleveraged institutions” could “spark . . . global panic.”9
The “first responder” solution, adopted just a month after Lehman Brothers filed
for bankruptcy protection, was to prevent these institutions from failing through
disbursements from the $700 billion Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP).10
Armed with TARP, policy makers drove to the burning neighborhood with lights
and sirens on, intending to stop the spread of the flames and reassure the populace
that the entire community would not burn to the ground.11

2. Geithner was president of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York from November
17, 2003, to January 26, 2009, and secretary of the Treasury from January 26, 2009, to
January 25, 2013. Timothy Geithner Fast Facts, CNN.COM (Aug. 19, 2014, 11:56 AM),
http://www.cnn.com/2013/02/25/us/timothy-geithner-fast-facts/.
3. TIMOTHY F. GEITHNER, STRESS TEST: REFLECTIONS ON FINANCIAL CRISES 9 (2014).
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Note the rhetorical shifts in the metaphor: those concerned with moral hazard
characterize the troubled firms as “pyromaniacs,” and Secretary Geithner refers to them as
“arsonists,” while President Obama describes them as careless smokers. See id. This Article
is concerned not with ascribing blame for the 2008 financial crisis but with describing and
understanding the impact. For that reason, it will utilize President Obama’s characterization.
8. GEITHNER, supra note 3, at 4–5, 122–27, 147–52, 181.
9. Id. at 4.
10. Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-343, 122 Stat. 3765.
11. TARP was not the only emergency program put in place by the federal government.
The Federal Reserve System, Department of Treasury, and Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation (FDIC) introduced a number of temporary programs to stabilize financial
institutions, including the Federal Reserve’s Term Auction Facility (TAF), Treasury’s
Capital Purchase Program (CPP), and the FDIC’s Temporary Liquidity Guarantee Program
(TLGP), among others. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-14-18,
GOVERNMENT SUPPORT FOR BANK HOLDING COMPANIES: STATUTORY CHANGES TO LIMIT
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The “neighborhood” in 2008 consisted of 7284 “homes.”12 The average value of
the homes was $1.5 million,13 but that is a very misleading figure because it does
not reflect the diversity of the neighborhood. Indeed, the “neighborhood” was
divided into several distinct regions. One segment consisted of 3066 working class
homes, each worth an average of $53,000.14 The next segment of 3705 homes was
much larger, each worth an average of $286,000.15 There were 509 mansions, each
worth an average of $10.6 million.16 At the epicenter of the neighborhood was an
ultraexclusive, gated community with only four megamansions. Those
megamansions were worth an average of $1.1 billion.17 It should also be noted that
approximately a quarter of the residents of the neighborhood were homeless or
living in substandard housing.18
FUTURE SUPPORT ARE NOT YET FULLY IMPLEMENTED 13 (2013) [hereinafter GAO-14-18],
available at http://www.gao.gov/assets/660/659004.pdf. The federal government also
provided “extraordinary support” to several individual financial institutions, including a $30
billion loan from the Federal Reserve Board to facilitate JPMorgan’s acquisition of Bear
Stearns, the placement of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac into conservatorship and subsequent
investments of $187.4 billion in the institutions through the Treasury’s Senior Preferred Stock
Purchase Agreements program, over $182 billion in assistance to AIG by the Federal Reserve
Board and Treasury, and additional assistance to Citigroup and Bank of America. Id. at 37–40.
12. The numbers in this paragraph describe the universe of commercial banks as of
December 31, 2007. Statistics on Depository Institutions—Compare Banks, FDIC.GOV,
https://www2.fdic.gov/SDI/ [hereinafter FDIC Statistics Report]. Readers who wish to review
the statistics in this section should launch the URL, click “Retrieve Reports,” run Standard
Report #1, and then select the appropriate parameters. Alternatively, readers can go to
https://www2.fdic.gov/SDI/SOB/, select “Commercial Banks,” “National,” “Asset Size,” the
appropriate report date, and “Assets and Liabilities” before clicking “Run Report.” Readers can
click through to a number of data sets to find the component parts of each data set and can view
statistics on commercial banks in sum, as well as those with assets less than $100 million,
between $100 million and $1 billion, and more than $1 billion. Data can also be saved to Excel.
13. For the purposes of this metaphor, the average asset value of commercial banks on
December 31, 2007, has been expressed in ‘000s. For example, the average commercial bank
had an asset value of $1.5 trillion, which translates to $1.5 million.
14. There were 3066 commercial banks with assets less than $100 million. They each
held an average of $53 million in assets.
15. There were 3705 commercial banks with assets more than $100 million and less
than $1 billion. They each held an average of $286 million in assets.
16. There were 513 commercial banks with assets more than $1 billion. Subtracting the four
largest commercial banks, the remaining 509 each held an average of $10.6 billion in assets.
17. The four largest commercial banks in the United States held an average of $1.1
trillion in assets as of December 31, 2007. They were JPMorgan Chase Bank ($1.3 trillion in
consolidated assets), Bank of America ($1.3 trillion), Citibank ($1.2 trillion), and Wachovia
Bank ($653 billion). FED. RESERVE SYS., INSURED U.S.-CHARTERED COMMERCIAL BANKS
THAT HAVE CONSOLIDATED ASSETS OF $300 MILLION OR MORE (2007), available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/Releases/Lbr/20071231/lrg_bnk_lst.pdf.
18. The most contemporary data provided by the FDIC regarding the number of
“unbanked” and “underbanked” households in the United States dates to a 2012 report
discussing the results of a 2011 survey. In 2011, approximately 21.7% of American
households were underbanked, meaning that they conducted some of their financial
transactions outside the mainstream banking system, relying to varying degrees on
alternative financial-service providers like payday loan services, prepaid cards,
nonbank-provided money orders, nonbank check cashing, rent-to-own stores, and pawnshops
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The fire started in the four megamansions, but as policy makers focused their
attentions there, they failed to appreciate that thousands of other homes were lit
aflame by drifting embers.19 Those burning structures were too small, even in the
aggregate, to attract the attention of the panicking public or anxious policy makers.
Those working-class and upper middle-class homes, numerically the vast majority
of homes in the neighborhood, were the community banks.20 The mansions and
megamansions were saved, but the configuration of the neighborhood changed in
significant ways. Over 322 homes burned to the ground during and in the
immediate aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis.21
After the flames were doused, policy makers endeavored to ensure that
homeowners could never fall asleep with a lit cigarette in bed again. That
second-wave response was the 2010 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”).22 But the major, lingering deficiency of
the Dodd-Frank strategy was that it once again failed to account for the
fundamental differences in size and business strategy that separate community
banks from larger financial institutions. The authors of Dodd-Frank believed the
fundamental problem that led to the 2008 financial crisis was that the
megamansions were too big, too flammable, and built too close to one another, so
(i.e., “slumlords”). In 2011, 7.3% of American households were unbanked, meaning that
they did not utilize mainstream financial services at all (i.e., “the homeless”). The unbanked
and underbanked generally incur much greater costs for financial services and face many
barriers to full participation in American economic life. See FDIC, NATIONAL SURVEY OF
UNBANKED AND UNDERBANKED HOUSEHOLDS 10 (2012), available at https://www.fdic.gov
/householdsurvey/2012_unbankedreport.pdf.
19.
At the end of 2008, program use—measured for each institution as the
percentage of total assets supported by the programs—was higher on average
for banks and bank holding companies with $50 billion or more in total assets
than for smaller firms. The six largest bank holding companies were significant
participants in several emergency programs . . . .
GAO-14-18, supra note 11.
20. There are a number of definitions of “community banks” used by policy makers and
scholars. The FDIC introduces the most nuanced definition in its 2012 Community Banking
Study. See FDIC, COMMUNITY BANKING STUDY 1-1 (2012) [hereinafter FDIC COMMUNITY
BANKING STUDY], available at https://www.fdic.gov/regulations/resources/cbi/report/cbi
-full.pdf. For the broad purposes of this Article, the term “community banks” refers to
commercial banks with assets of less than $1 billion.
21. Between January 1, 2007, and December 31, 2010, a total of 318 commercial banks
and savings institutions failed. David C. Wheelock, Have Acquisitions of Failed Banks
Increased the Concentration of U.S. Banking Markets?, 93 FED. RES. BANK ST. LOUIS REV.
155, 155 (2011), available at http://research.stlouisfed.org/publications/review/11/05/155
-168Wheelock.pdf. The vast majority were community banks. The most significant failure
was Washington Mutual Bank, which was organized as a thrift rather than a commercial
bank. Washington Mutual was placed in receivership by the FDIC on September 25, 2008,
and acquired by JPMorgan Chase Bank on the same day for $1.9 billion. Before its
receivership, Washington Mutual was the sixth largest bank in the United States with
approximately $307 billion in total assets. Eric Dash & Andrew Ross Sorkin, In Largest
Bank Failure, U.S. Seizes, Then Sells, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 26, 2008, at A1.
22. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No.
111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010).
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that once the fire started, it quickly spread.23 But Dodd-Frank ultimately did
nothing to reduce the size of those structures or their interconnectedness.24 Instead,
the majority of its provisions apply to every structure in the neighborhood,
regardless of size, flammability, or whether the occupants even have matches on
the premises. In essence, the smaller homeowners were forced to extinguish the
fires caused by others without the subsidy of emergency assistance and are now
required to bear the cost of complying with extensive new regulations intended to
prevent behavior that they never engaged in. Six years later, the result of the policy
responses to the 2008 financial crisis is a neighborhood with far fewer homes,25
more homeless people,26 and a handful of even larger megamansions where the
homeowners still smoke in bed.27

23. See, e.g., H. Rodgin Cohen, Preventing the Fire Next Time: Too Big To Fail, 90
TEX. L. REV. 1717, 1720 (2012) (“Whatever may have been the actual cause and effect,
Lehman’s failure had a traumatic impact on policymakers with respect to their ensuing
decisions. There was now agreement as to the resolution of the Hobson’s Choice between
taxpayer-backed assistance to financial institutions and the potential of a catastrophic
systemic failure in the absence of such assistance. The risk to the taxpayer and the other
issues created by effective acknowledgment of TBTF were deemed to be outweighed by the
risk to the financial system and the broader economy from a disorderly failure.”). Of course,
not everyone agrees with this narrative of the 2008 financial crisis. See, e.g., FIN. CRISIS
INQUIRY COMM’N, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT 441 (2009) [hereinafter FINANCIAL
CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT] (dissenting statement of Peter J. Wallison), available at
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GPO-FCIC/pdf/GPO-FCIC.pdf.
24. See Examining How the Dodd-Frank Act Could Result in More Taxpayer-Funded
Bailouts: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 113th Cong. 13 (2013) (statement of
Jeffrey M. Lacker, President, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond) (“The problem known as
too-big-to-fail consists of two mutually reinforcing expectations. First, some financial
institution creditors feel protected by an implicit government commitment of support should
the institution face financial distress. . . . Second, policymakers at times believe that the failure
of a large financial firm with a high reliance on short-term funding would result in undesirable
disruptions of financial markets and economic activity. . . . [With Dodd-Frank, w]e appear to
have replicated the two mutually reinforcing expectations that define too-big-to-fail.”).
25. Between January 1, 2008, and December 31, 2013, a total of 1408 commercial
banks disappeared. During the same timeframe, nearly five hundred FDIC-insured financial
institutions failed. Failures and Assistance Transactions, FDIC.GOV, https://www2.fdic.gov
/hsob/HSOBSummaryRpt.asp?begYear=2008&endYear=2013&state=1&Print=Y
(noting
that 489 FDIC-insured institutions failed during this six-year period).
26. The percentage of American households which are underbanked increased from
18.2% in 2009 to 20.1% in 2011, while the unbanked increased from 7.6% in 2009 to 8.2%
in 2011. More than one in four American households were either unbanked or underbanked
in 2011. FDIC, supra note 18, at 4.
27. See, e.g., Peter Eavis & Michael Corkery, Bank Finds a Mistake: $4 Billion Less
Capital, N.Y. TIMES, April 29, 2014, at B1 (“‘There are signs that controls are not as tight as
they need to be,’ said Mike Mayo, an analyst at CLSA. ‘It’s a bank. It needs to get the
numbers right.’”); John A. Allison, The Financial Crisis and the Free Market Cure,
Federalist Society Practice Group Teleforum Conference Call (Jan. 10, 2013), in ENGAGE,
July 2013, at 43, 45 (“A lot of banks made large mistakes, and I would have allowed those
banks to fail. In fact, it’s frustrating to me that Citigroup has been saved three times in my
career, and every time, they get bigger and worse. And I believe as long as the government

184

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 90:179

Since Dodd-Frank was signed into law, various congressional committees and
federal regulators have held hearings on the potential unintended consequences of
Dodd-Frank, particularly the impact on small financial institutions and small
businesses. Community bankers have offered consistent testimony reflecting
three themes.28
First, as will be discussed in Part I, community banks play a vital role in this
nation’s economy, particularly with respect to small businesses and rural
communities, and their continued health and vitality is central to the nation’s
economic recovery.
Second, as discussed in Part I.C, community banks did not cause the 2008
financial crisis.29 They did not engage in subprime residential lending.30 They did
not package and sell securitized mortgages. They did not participate in the opaque
and risky derivatives markets.31
Third, while Dodd-Frank roughly distinguishes between banks on the basis of
size, excluding financial institutions with assets of less than $10 billion from some
continues to bail what I call ‘crony capitalist institutions’ out, like Citigroup, they will get
bigger and worse, because if you have an implicit government guarantee, then you are going
to take a lot of risk in the good times.”).
28. See, e.g., On The Record: Community Bankers Speak Out On the Impact of
Dodd-Frank Regulations, HOUSE FIN. SERVICES COMMITTEE (Oct. 17, 2011),
http://financialservices.house.gov/blog/?postid=264807 [hereinafter On the Record].
29. See Jerome H. Powell, Member, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Community
Banking: Connecting Research and Policy, Remarks at the Federal Reserve/Conference of State
Bank Supervisors Community Banking Research Conference 1 (Oct. 3, 2013), available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/powell20131003a.pdf (“Community banks
have faced significant challenges in recent years, as our nation has endured a major financial crisis
and recession, followed by a painfully slow recovery. To make matters worse, community
bankers, who played no part in causing the financial crisis, have been forced to fight to ensure
that they are not swept up in a torrent of costly new regulations that were intended to address
problems at those very large banks that did contribute to the crisis.” (emphasis added)).
30. Community banks may have made residential loans to borrowers with poor or
limited credit history, known as “subprime” loans, but they generally kept those loans on
their books rather than selling them into the secondary market. There is nothing intrinsically
wrong with making a subprime loan. Traditionally, the self-employed and farmers have been
borrowers of subprime loans because they lack salary histories. Subprime loans at
community banks are not understood to be a precipitating cause of the 2008 financial
crisis—these banks had every incentive to originate good loans that would be repaid. See,
e.g., Elizabeth A. Duke, Member, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Community
Banks and Mortgage Lending, Remarks at the Community Bankers Symposium 13 (Nov. 9,
2012), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/duke20121109a.pdf
(“Community bankers argue that they never engaged in the sort of lending practices that led
to the financial crisis. And I think that in most cases, the evidence supports their claims. . . .
[O]ver the last several years, on average, mortgages held by community banks outperformed
even fixed-rate, prime loans, the best performing mortgage category. I think this statistic by
itself is a strong testament to the responsible lending practices of community banks.”).
31. See, e.g., Xuan (Shelly) Shen & Valentina Hartarska, Financial Derivatives at
Community Banks (Oct. 2, 2013) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://www.stlouisfed.org/banking/community-banking-conference/PDF/Financial_Derivatives
_Community_Banks_%20XS_and_VH.pdf (concluding that community banks primarily used
derivatives to hedge interest-rate risk rather than to substitute for capital or manage credit risk).
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rules, it is still expected to have a significant adverse impact on community banks
by increasing compliance costs and promoting the standardization of financial
products. Rather than strengthening the safety and soundness of the American
financial system and protecting consumers, Dodd-Frank may ultimately create
several new problems for the American economy.
Ironically, Dodd-Frank exacerbates “too big to fail” because it is leading to
greater asset concentration in a smaller number of financial institutions.32 For the
past several decades, bank consolidation and asset concentration have increased
dramatically in the American banking sector.33 Between 1980 and year-end 2013,
the total number of bank and thrift charters in the United States dropped from
approximately 20,000 to 6812.34 About 2900 institutions failed during that time
period, fully 84% of all financial-institution failures since the creation of the FDIC
in 1934.35 Except during the period following the savings-and-loan crisis of the late
1980s and early 1990s and the years since the 2008 financial crisis, bank failures
have been relatively rare.36 Mergers, acquisitions, and consolidations within
organizations have been much more common.37
In the five-year period from 2008–13, the number of commercial banks in the
United States decreased from 7284 to 5876, a reduction of nearly 20%.38
Thirty-five percent of that decrease is attributable to bank failures,39 and the
remainder is attributable to voluntary dissolution and mergers.
Both failures and mergers disproportionately impact smaller banks. The number
of banks with assets of less than $100 million decreased by more than 80% from
1985 to 2010, while the number of banks with assets greater than $10 billion nearly

32. Allison, supra note 27, at 47 (“[O]ne of the ironies is that it’s very clear that the
long-term policy of “too big to fail” . . . has caused consolidation in the industry. . . . [If we
had a functioning private market,] Citigroup wouldn’t be here. We wouldn’t be worrying
about this. They would have been broken up by the market long, long ago. . . . [T]he
incentive for institutions to stay large is very powerful when you have an implicit
government guarantee.”).
33. Benjamin R. Backup & Richard A. Brown, Community Banks Remain Resilient
Amid Industry Consolidation, 8 FDIC Q., no. 2, 2014, at 33, 33 (“Consolidation . . . has been
a defining trend in the U.S. banking industry since around 1980.”).
34. Id. There are many reasons for this consolidation. “One of the most important
factors driving voluntary consolidation during this period was the relaxation of restrictions
on intrastate branching and interstate banking that took place in the 1980s and early 1990s.
Based largely in state law, these long-standing restrictions had the effect of artificially
inflating the number of banking charters, and their removal was bound to result in
consolidation.” FDIC COMMUNITY BANKING STUDY, supra note 20, at II. In fact, nearly 5000
banks were consolidated within organizations from 1984 to 2011. Id. at 2-1.
35. Failures and Assistance Transactions, FDIC.GOV, https://www2.fdic.gov/hsob
/SelectRpt.asp?EntryTyp=30&Header=1.
36. See id.
37. Since 1990, there have been 6.5 mergers for every one bank failure. Bob Solomon,
The Fall (and Rise?) of Community Banking: The Continued Importance of Local
Institutions, 2 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 945, 947 (2012).
38. See FDIC Statistics Report, supra note 12.
39. See Failed Bank List, FDIC.GOV, http://www.fdic.gov/bank/individual/failed
/banklist.html [hereinafter FDIC Failed Bank List].
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tripled over the same period.40 Meanwhile, the concentration of capital in those
large banks increased. At year-end 2013, the four largest commercial banks in the
United States—JPMorgan Chase, Bank of America, Wells Fargo, and Citibank—
held total assets of $6.1 trillion.41 JPMorgan Chase alone held nearly $2 trillion in
total assets—14% of the total assets of all commercial banks combined—and the
others each held $1.3 to $1.4 trillion. The “Big Four” banks held 44.6% of total
commercial-bank assets at year-end 2013.42
There is a meaningful size differential between the “Big Four” and other large
banks. The fifth-largest commercial bank, U.S. Bank, held $360 billion in total
assets at year-end 2013.43 At year-end 2013, 5876 commercial banks held $13.7
trillion in total assets.44 The “Big Four” alone held 44.6% of that sum, while the
twenty largest commercial banks held $9.1 trillion, or 66.4%.45
At year-end 2013, there were 540 commercial banks in the United States that
each held total assets in excess of $1 billion.46 Collectively, these “noncommunity
banks” held 91.2% of total commercial banking assets.47 Conversely, community
banks constituted 90.8% of all commercial banks48 yet held only 8.4% of total
commercial bank assets.49
To better understand the consolidation of the American commercial banking
sector, it is useful to compare year-end 2001 to year-end 2013. This temporal
snapshot captures the period when securitization began to gain steam, as well as the
2008 financial crisis itself and the subsequent recovery.
The concentration of assets in the “Big Four” commercial banks naturally
increased during the heyday of securitization50 and the housing bubble, from 27.1% at

40. RICHARD A. BROWN, CHIEF ECONOMIST, FDIC, COMMUNITY BANKING BY THE
NUMBERS: THE FDIC COMMUNITY BANKING RESEARCH PROJECT 3 (2012), available at
https://www.fdic.gov/news/conferences/communitybanking/community_banking_by_the
_numbers_clean.pdf. There were 13,631 institutions with less than $100 million in assets in
1985, and 2625 in 2010. There were thirty-six institutions with more than $10 billion in
assets in 1985 and 107 in 2010. Id.
41. See FED. RESERVE SYS., INSURED U.S.-CHARTERED COMMERCIAL BANKS THAT HAVE
CONSOLIDATED ASSETS OF $300 MILLION OR MORE (2013) [hereinafter 2013 STATISTICAL
RELEASE], available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/Releases/Lbr/20131231/lrg_bnk
_lst.pdf. For the purposes of the FDIC’s Statistics on Depository Institutions Report, “total
assets” means “[t]he sum of all assets owned by the institution including cash, loans,
securities, bank premises and other assets [but not including] off-balance-sheet accounts.”
Definitions, FDIC.GOV, https://www2.fdic.gov/SDI/sitemap_rpt.asp?DRSLineLevel=10.
42. See 2013 STATISTICAL RELEASE, supra note 41; see also FDIC Statistics Report,
supra note 12. In contrast, the four largest commercial banks held 27.1% of total assets at
year-end 2001 and 40.6% of total assets at year-end 2007.
43. See 2013 STATISTICAL RELEASE, supra note 41.
44. See FDIC Statistics Report, supra note 12.
45. See 2013 STATISTICAL RELEASE, supra note 41.
46. FDIC Statistics Report, supra note 12.
47. See id.
48. Calculated by dividing 5336 community banks by 5876 commercial banks. See id.
49. Calculated by dividing approximately $1.1 trillion by approximately $13.7 trillion.
See id.
50. See Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Dark Side of Universal Banking: Financial
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year-end 2001 to 33.6% at year-end 2004.51 Perhaps more surprisingly, total asset
concentration became more pronounced during the 2008 financial crisis and the
subsequent recovery period, increasing to and stabilizing at 41%–45% since 2008.52
The total consolidated assets held by American commercial banks increased
from $6.55 trillion at year-end 2001 to $13.67 trillion at year-end 2013, an increase
of 109%.53 But a rising tide does not necessarily lift all boats equally. During that
period, the total assets in the four largest commercial banks increased by 244%,
nearly ten times the aggregate increase enjoyed by the community banks.54 The top
twenty commercial banks also disproportionately benefitted from this period of
growth—recognizing a 183% increase in their total assets from year-end 2001 to
year-end 2013.55
Many policy makers in the early 1990s argued that industry consolidation would
improve the “efficiency, safety, and profitability of the banking industry,” a line of
reasoning that culminated in the Riegle-Neal Act of 1994.56 However, scholars like
Arthur Wilmarth, Jr. have long argued that a “banking industry dominated by a few big
banks [is] likely to be less efficient, less profitable, more risky, and less competitive
than the decentralized banking system that ha[s] long existed in the United States.”57
That decentralized banking system is governed by a regime of regulation by
accretion—the result of legislative responses to particular crises from the Civil War
Conglomerates and the Origins of the Subprime Financial Crisis, 41 CONN. L. REV. 963,
963–64 (2009) (noting that seventeen large, complex financial institutions “dominated
domestic and global markets for securities underwriting, syndicated lending, asset-backed
securities (ABS), over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives, and collateralized debt obligations
(CDOs)” and used an “originate to distribute” strategy to “maximize their fee income, reduce
their capital charges, and transfer to investors the risks associated with securitized loans”).
51. Compare FED. RESERVE SYS., INSURED U.S.-CHARTERED COMMERCIAL BANKS THAT
HAVE CONSOLIDATED ASSETS OF $100 MILLION OR MORE (2001), available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/Releases/Lbr/20011231/lrg_bnk_lst.pdf [hereinafter 2001
STATISTICAL RELEASE], with FED. RESERVE SYS., INSURED U.S.-CHARTERED COMMERCIAL
BANKS THAT HAVE CONSOLIDATED ASSETS OF $300 MILLION OR MORE (2004), available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/Releases/Lbr/20041231/lrg_bnk_lst.pdf.
52. See FED. RESERVE SYS., INSURED U.S.-CHARTERED COMMERCIAL BANKS THAT HAVE
CONSOLIDATED ASSETS OF $300 MILLION OR MORE (2008), available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/Releases/Lbr/20081231/lrg_bnk_lst.pdf.
53. Compare 2001 STATISTICAL RELEASE, supra note 51, with 2013 STATISTICAL
RELEASE, supra note 41.
54. Compare 2001 STATISTICAL RELEASE, supra note 51, with 2013 STATISTICAL
RELEASE, supra note 41.Total deposits increased by 137% during this time period. For banks
with assets in excess of $1 billion, total deposits increased by 167%, while total deposits
only increased by 32% in community banks. For the purposes of the FDIC’s Statistics on
Depository Institutions Report, “total deposits” is defined as “[t]he sum of all deposits
including demand deposits, money market deposits, other savings deposits, time deposits and
deposits in foreign offices.” Definitions, supra note 41.
55. Compare 2001 STATISTICAL RELEASE, supra note 51, with 2013 STATISTICAL
RELEASE, supra note 41.
56. Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994, Pub. L. No.
103-328, 108 Stat. 2338 (permitting interstate bank mergers and authorizing adequately
capitalized bank holding companies to acquire banks in any state).
57. Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., Too Good To Be True? The Unfulfilled Promises Behind
Big Bank Mergers, 2 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 1, 4 (1995).
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to the 2008 financial crisis.58 Each of these legislative efforts was a well-meaning
attempt to deal with the perceived problems that led to each crisis, but the overall
strategy is flawed and the cumulative regulatory burden exacerbates market
distortions. Between 1990 and 2005, “more than 800 new regulations [were]
imposed on banks.”59 The net effect is a federal regulatory system for banking that
is unnecessarily inefficient and expensive and that imposes unintended negative
consequences on community banks, consumers, and the economy. It is, as one
banker put it, a system of “misregulation.”60
The fundamental flaw of the current regulatory approach is that it assumes the
word “bank” can be used to describe market participants that engage in similar
activities and pose similar risks to economic stability and consumers. That premise
is false. The average size of the top four banks is $1.5 trillion.61 The average size of
the next sixteen banks is $188 billion.62 In stark contrast, the average community
bank holds $206 million in assets,63 and 1814 community banks hold less than $100
million in assets each, with an average size of $58 million.64
Over time, the differences between the largest commercial banks and the
community banks have grown more pronounced. In 1984, the average
noncommunity bank was twelve times larger than the average community bank.65
In 2011, the average noncommunity bank was seventy-four times larger.66 At the
margins, of course, those differences are much more pronounced. Just one of the
“Big Four” commercial banks is larger than the 5000+ community banks
combined.67 The twentieth largest bank is comparable in asset size to the 1814
smallest community banks combined.68

58. See John C. Coffee, Jr., The Political Economy of Dodd-Frank: Why Financial
Reform Tends To Be Frustrated and Systemic Risk Perpetuated, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 1019,
1020 (2012) (“A good crisis should never go to waste. In the world of financial regulation,
experience has shown—since at least the time of the South Sea Bubble three hundred years
ago—that only after a catastrophic market collapse can legislators and regulators overcome
the resistance of the financial community and adopt comprehensive ‘reform’ legislation.”);
see also Jerry W. Markham, Banking Regulation: Its History and Future, 4 N.C. BANKING
INST. 221 (2000).
59. Stephanie E. Dreyer & Peter G. Weinstock, Less Is More: Changing the Regulator’s
Role To Prevent Excess in Consumer Disclosure, 123 BANKING L.J. 99, 103 (2006).
60. Allison, supra note 27, at 48.
61. Calculated by dividing approximately $6 trillion in total assets across four banks.
See 2013 STATISTICAL RELEASE, supra note 41.
62. Calculated by dividing approximately $3 trillion in total assets across sixteen banks.
See id.
63. Calculated by dividing $1.1 trillion in total assets across 5336 community banks.
See FDIC Statistics Report, supra note 12.
64. See id.
65. FDIC COMMUNITY BANKING STUDY, supra note 20, at 2-9.
66. Id.
67. The smallest of the Big Four, Citibank, holds $1.3 trillion in total assets, compared
to $1.1 trillion held by the community banks. See 2013 STATISTICAL RELEASE, supra note 41.
68. The 1814 smallest community banks have combined total assets of $106 billion,
compared to $103 billion in total assets for Northern Trust Corporation, the twentieth largest
commercial bank as of December 31, 2013. Compare FDIC Statistics Report, supra note 12
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The market participants that we broadly label “banks” have such different
business models that they are barely in the same industry. Community banks and
noncommunity banks both take deposits and make loans, but the similarities end
there. Since the 1999 Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act,69 which reduced barriers between
depository banks and investment banks, the large, complex financial institutions
have diversified far afield of traditional banking activities, and federal regulatory
activity has struggled to adapt to the creativity and entrepreneurship employed by
those large institutions.70
The neighborhood fire that sparked in 2008 has been extinguished, but damage
has been done. The working-class homes have been decimated, and slumlords are
moving into the empty parcels.71 The four megamansions have grown even larger,
but Dodd-Frank did not erect a firewall around them. Instead, it instituted new
requirements that seek to fireproof all of the homes, at a cost that the more modest
homeowners, still reeling from their unsubsidized cleanup efforts, struggle to absorb.
The American economy has long benefited from a healthy, diverse, and
competitive marketplace in banking and financial services. That marketplace is
steadily becoming less competitive and less diverse because of misguided
regulation. The role of regulators should be, at a minimum, like physicians—first,
do no harm. Instead, the American one-size-fits-all regulatory approach is
paradoxically advantaging the very institutions that policy makers have labeled as
the most dangerous. The unintended consequences of these flawed policies are
hastening consolidation and reducing competition. We need to take a step back and
fundamentally rethink our regulatory approach to banking—to target our resources
toward real risks to the American consumer and the American economy in order to
reverse these trends.
I. WHY COMMUNITY BANKS MATTER
Before examining the impact of Dodd-Frank on community banks, it is useful to
define what community banks are, to understand their importance to the American
(aggregating commercial banks with assets up to $1B), with 2013 STATISTICAL RELEASE,
supra note 41 (ranking largest banks, including Northern Trust).
69. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (1999).
70. See generally Russell J. Funk & Daniel Hirschman, Derivatives and Deregulation:
Financial Innovation and the Demise of Glass-Steagall, 59 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 669 (2014).
71. See, e.g., U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 743
tbl.1194 (2012), available at https://www.census.gov/compendia/statab/2012/tables
/12s1194.pdf (“Mortgage Originations and Delinquency and Foreclosure Rates: 1990 to
2010”). Note that the percentage of residential loans in foreclosure rose from 2.0% in 2007
to 4.6% in 2010, while the percentage of subprime conventional loans in foreclosure
increased from 8.7% to 14.5% during the same period. Over a quarter of subprime
conventional loans were delinquent at the end of 2010. See also OLIVER CHANG,
VISHWANATH TIRUPATTUR & JAMES EGAN, MORGAN STANLEY, HOUSING MARKET INSIGHTS:
A RENTERSHIP SOCIETY 1 (2011), available at http://www.morganstanleyfa.com/public
/projectfiles/5bee89b1-94ce-45b5-b4b6-09f0ffdc626a.pdf (“The demand for shelter is
growing, but the lack of mortgage credit will drive this demand to the rental market at the
expense of the owner-occupied market. As household formations grow and distressed
liquidations continue, the demand for both multi-family and single-family rental units will
likely increase.”).
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economy, and to discuss the role that they played in the precipitating event to
Dodd-Frank—the 2008 financial crisis.
A. Who Are the Community Banks?72
The landscape of the American banking industry is distinct from other Western
countries because it has traditionally been decentralized and dominated by a large
number of small, local depository institutions. The term “community bank” has
been used in recent decades to describe institutions that “focus on providing
traditional banking services in their local communities.”73 The community-banking
model was summarized by Marty Reinhart, the president of Heritage Bank in
Spencer, Wisconsin, a $100 million bank formed in 1908:
Community banks . . . serve rural, small town, and suburban customers
and markets that are not comprehensively served by large banks. Our
business is based on longstanding relationships in the communities in
which we live. We make loans often passed over by the large banks
because a community banker’s personal knowledge of the community
and the borrower provides firsthand insight into the true credit quality
of a loan, in stark contrast to the statistical models used by large banks
located in other states and regions. These localized credit decisions,
made one-by-one by thousands of community bankers, support small
businesses, economic growth, and job creation.74
Federal regulators employ various definitions of community banks,75 but as Mr.
Reinhart’s testimony suggests, community banks generally differ from other

72. This subpart draws heavily on the contributions Joseph W. Norman made to a joint
project with this author. See TANYA D. MARSH & JOSEPH W. NORMAN, AM. ENTER. INST.,
THE IMPACT OF DODD-FRANK ON COMMUNITY BANKS (2013), available at http://www.aei.org
/files/2013/05/06/-the-impact-of-doddfrank-on-community-banks_164334553537.pdf.
73. FDIC COMMUNITY BANKING STUDY, supra note 20, at 1-1; see also BENJAMIN M.
LAWSKY, N.Y. DEP’T OF FIN. SERVS., COMMUNITY BANKING REPORT 1 (2013), available at
http://www.dfs.ny.gov/reportpub/comm_bank_rpt_2013_02.pdf (“At its essence, community
banking is based on a simple and traditional business model. Community banks focus on
gathering deposits from the communities they serve and exclusively lending back to those
communities.”).
74. Regulatory Reform: Examining How New Regulations Are Impacting Financial
Institutions, Small Businesses, and Consumers: Field Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Fin.
Insts. & Consumer Credit of the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 112th Cong. app. at 58 (2011)
[hereinafter Regulatory Reform Hearing] (prepared statement of Marty Reinhart, President,
Heritage Bank, Spencer, Wisconsin).
75. Among the banking industry’s three primary regulators—the Federal Reserve, the
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), and the FDIC—no single regulatory
definition for “community bank” exists. The Federal Reserve defines community banks to
include institutions with $10 billion or less in total assets. Duke, supra note 30, at 5. The
OCC defines community banks as banking organizations with less than $1 billion in total
assets. See OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, COMMUNITY BANK
SUPERVISION: COMPTROLLER’S HANDBOOK 1 (2010), available at http://www.occ.treas.gov
/publications/publications-by-type/comptrollers-handbook/cbs.pdf. And, lastly, the FDIC
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commercial banks with respect to (1) their size, (2) their location, and (3) their
methods of processing information.76
1. Size
The simplest and crudest way to define community banks is as commercial
banks with assets of less than $1 billion.77 By any definition, community banks
make up the vast majority of American commercial banks. As of December 31,
2013, commercial banks with less than $1 billion in total assets constituted 91% of
all commercial banks.78 Although numerically dominant, community banks held
only 8.4% of total commercial-bank assets.79 Thirty-one percent of commercial
banks held assets less than $100 million, while 60% held assets between $100
million and $1 billion.80 There are important differences between a $100 million
bank and a $1 billion bank, but they have more in common with each other than
with the large, complex financial institutions.
2. Location
Community banks tend to operate in limited geographic areas—82% of
community banks operated within three or fewer counties in 2011, while 37% of
noncommunity banks operated within three or fewer counties.81
Although many community banks are located in suburban and urban counties,
one of the most important ways that community banks contribute to the American
economy is through their service to rural areas that would otherwise go without
banking access.82 Rural areas make a significant contribution to the American
formerly defined community banks as banking organizations with less than $1 billion in
assets but recently revised its definition by moving to a more inclusive, multicriteria
approach. See infra note 77.
76. There are other depository institutions that are not classified as commercial banks but that
are functionally similar to community banks, including credit unions, thrifts, and mutual-savings
institutions. Because this Article generally relies on FDIC data pertaining to commercial banks,
the calculations do not include those other institutions unless specifically noted.
77. The FDIC has developed a far more nuanced approach to defining community
banks, noting that
[o]ne problem with defining community banks using a fixed size limit is that
any dollar-based yardstick must be adjusted over time to account for factors
such as inflation, economic growth, and the size of the banking industry itself.
According to any of these measures, $1 billion is not what it used to be.
FDIC COMMUNITY BANKING STUDY, supra note 20, at 1-1. Despite the wisdom of the FDIC’s
observation, for the sake of simplicity, this Article will use the straightforward size limit.
78. See FDIC Statistics Report, supra note 12.
79. See id.
80. See id.
81. FDIC COMMUNITY BANKING STUDY, supra note 20, at 3-3.
82. Note that when this Article uses the term “rural,” it does so somewhat colloquially.
The FDIC uses the term to describe one category of nonmetropolitan counties, the other
category being micropolitan. Rural counties are those with fewer than 10,000 in population.
Micropolitan counties are those with populations between 10,000 and 50,000. For a more
thorough explanation, see id. at 3-4.
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economy. Counties with fewer than 10,000 in population contribute 4.4% of U.S.
real economic output, while counties with populations between 10,000 and 50,000
contribute another 7.9%. Combined, these nonmetropolitan areas contribute over
12% of U.S. economic activity.83 These rural—and productive—areas are also
highly dependent on community banks to provide credit and other necessary
financial services.
Community banks are much more likely than larger banks to operate in small
towns and sparsely populated regions,84 making up more than 70% of banking
offices in rural areas.85
As a result, while most metro areas tend to be well-served by
institutions with a variety of business models, many nonmetro (and a
surprising number of metro) areas tend to rely much more heavily on
community banks as their lifeline to mainstream financial services. In
2011, there were 629 U.S. counties, with just over 6 million in
population, where community banks operated offices, but where no
noncommunity banking offices were present. . . . There were another
639 counties where community banks operated offices but where fewer
than three noncommunity banking offices were present. . . . Taken
together, these data point to more than 1,200 counties (out of a total of
3,238), encompassing 16.3 million people, who would have limited
physical access to mainstream banking services without the presence of
community banks.86
The relationship between community banks and rural communities is a source of
both strength and weakness to community banks. Between 1980 and 2010, the
population of the United States increased by more than 36%, but more than half of
all rural counties lost population.87 Community banks located in depopulating areas
have proven resilient but face challenges to future growth. For example, the Great
Plains states face the most severe depopulation: 86% of those rural counties lost
population from 1980 to 2010.88 With aggregate assets of $174.6 billion, the 836
community banks headquartered in Great Plains states may be a blip on the balance
sheet of a megabank, but their presence and stability is vital to the future of the
communities that they serve.89 The success of a closely held rural community bank
should be measured with different metrics than a publicly traded, large, complex
financial institution. Community banks warrant a broader focus on social utility
than growth or profitability.

83. Id.
84. Studies show that community banks are four times more likely than large banks to
have an office in rural counties. Id.
85. Id. at 3-5.
86. Id.
87. John M. Anderlik & Richard D. Cofer Jr., Long-Term Trends in Rural Depopulation
and Their Implications for Community Banks, 8 FDIC Q., no. 2, 2014, at 44, 44.
88. Id. at 48.
89. Id. at 51 tbl.4.
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3. Methods of Processing Information
Perhaps the most important difference between community banks and large banks
is the way that they process information about customers and make underwriting
decisions. The community-bank model is often described as “relationship banking,”
while the large-bank model is referred to as “transactional banking.”90
Transactional banking involves highly standardized products that “require little
human input to manage and involve information that is generally easily available
and reliable. Thus, in transactional banking hard information drives
performance.”91 Financial institutions that utilize transactional banking rely heavily
on mechanical processes such as credit scoring, which involves incorporating hard
data into quantitative computer models to make underwriting decisions.92
Transactional banking is efficient, particularly when replicated on a large scale—
but because it focuses on hard data, it largely excludes human judgment from
underwriting decisions.93
Large banks serve both commercial and retail customers but tend to focus on
those who are easily and cheaply processed through the transactional-banking
model. These banks are interested in commodity banking (i.e., large-volume credit
cards), large commercial customers, and international customers.94 Large banks
rely more on purchased liabilities to fund lending, while community banks rely on
core deposits.95
Community banks deploy those deposits into loans through the relationshipbanking model, which builds on longstanding customer relationships that give the
banks richer access to “soft information” about their customers.96 Computer models
may be used to enhance underwriting, but more authority is given to community
bank employees to make lending decisions.97 Soft information, by its nature, is not
generally available and is difficult to quantify.98 It is more expensive to acquire and
process.99 However, studies have shown that many borrowers, particularly small
businesses, farmers, and individuals, are better served by relationship banking than
by the transactional-banking model.100 For example, the president of a $250 million
bank in the upper Midwest explained that his customers face challenges that larger

90. Scott E. Hein, Timothy W. Koch & S. Scott Macdonald, On the Uniqueness of
Community Banks, 90 FED. RES. BANK ATLANTA ECON. REV., no. 1, 2005, at 15, 17–18.
91. Id. at 18.
92. Id. at 19.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 25.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 18.
97. Id. at 19.
98. Id.
99. See id. at 20.
100. See id. at 17, 19. These borrowers are sometimes called “informationally opaque.”
Tim Critchfield, Tyler Davis, Lee Davison, Heather Gratton, George Hanc & Katherine
Samolyk, Community Banks: Their Recent Past, Current Performance, and Future
Prospects, 16 FDIC BANKING REV., no. 3, 2004, at 1, 4.
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banks unfamiliar with the area would not understand.101 The community served by
his bank is reliant upon timber and mining, both activities that are seasonal. As a
result, cash flows for both consumer and business customers vary throughout the
year. The community bank understands this local reality and is able to successfully
underwrite and structure loans for borrowers who would be unlikely to obtain
credit from large banks.102
Another value of the relationship-banking model is that it includes a broader
range of services than the simple provision of funds. “In the case of a relationship
loan, the lender many times adds real value by providing accounting, business
planning, and tax planning expertise.”103
The relationship-banking model benefits the American economy in two main
ways. First, relationship banking results in loans that are more likely to be repaid
than those issued through transactional banking.104 In every individual and
commercial loan category, community banks had lower average net charge-off
rates than noncommunity banks from 1991 to 2011.105 During real-estate
downturns, “loan loss rates were much higher at noncommunity banks than at
community banks.”106 Second, the relationship-banking model relies upon repeat
business within a limited population, which provides a strong economic
disincentive to predatory lending and other practices that exploit consumers.107
Although transactional banking theoretically allows banks to process loans at a
lower cost than does relationship banking, Federal Reserve data consistently shows

101. Telephone interview with Noah Wilcox, President & Chief Executive Officer,
Grand Rapids State Bank, Grand Rapids, Minn. (Feb. 2, 2013) (notes on file with author).
102. Duke, supra note 30, at 6 (“Community banks have long been a source of loans that,
for a variety of reasons, do not fit the parameters of conforming government-sponsored
enterprise loans or eligibility for government-guaranteed programs.”).
103. Hein et al., supra note 90, at 18–19.
104. FDIC COMMUNITY BANKING STUDY, supra note 20, at III (“Community banks have
almost always incurred lower credit losses than noncommunity banks.”); Esther L. George,
President and CEO, Fed. Reserve Bank of Kan. City, Can Community Banks Still Compete?
Remarks at the 2012 Community Banking Conference 4 (Nov. 2, 2012), available at
http://www.kc.frb.org/publicat/speeches/2012-George-KansasCity-CommunityBanking-11
-02.pdf (“While many now claim that the value of customer relationships is declining with
credit scoring and credit risk models, a recent study at our Bank found that there is real value
in relationship lending and in the soft personal information on customers that community
bankers typically have.”).
105. FDIC COMMUNITY BANKING STUDY, supra note 20, at 4-6 tbl.4.4.
106. Id. at 4-6.
107. George Hansard, President and CEO of the Pecos County State Bank in Fort
Stockton, Texas, a $150 million community bank, explained the market incentives:
“[C]ommunity banks have no desire to make bad loans. Bad loans not only impact the
bank’s bottom line, but they also negatively impact the banker’s job, the community, and are
also negative to a borrower. And a bad loan makes a good customer a bad customer.” An
Examination of the Challenges Facing Community Financial Institutions in Texas: Field
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Fin. Insts. & Consumer Credit of the H. Comm. on Fin.
Servs., 112th Cong. 6–7 (2012) [hereinafter Texas Community Banks Hearing] (statement of
George H. Hansard, President and CEO, The Pecos County State Bank, Fort Stockton, Texas).
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that large banks charge higher fees than community banks and have increased their
fees more over time.108
B. The Role of Community Banks in the American Economy
In recent decades, noncommunity banks have demonstrated that they are
generally more profitable than community banks.109 However, the 2012 FDIC
Community Banking Study concluded that community banks actually outperform
noncommunity banks in generating net interest income and yields on earning assets
and in reducing credit losses and noninterest expenses—core banking services.110
Nevertheless, noncommunity banks generate a higher return on assets because they
have multiple lines of business that support “their ability to generate much higher
volumes of noninterest income.”111 In contrast, community banks rely almost
entirely on net interest margin (the spread between the cost of deposits and the
interest rate charged on loans, minus expenses) and deposit service charges.112
Traditionally, banks have been understood to exist because there are significant
barriers between borrowers and lenders, and banks that take deposits and make
loans serve an intermediary role that is essential to a functioning economy.113 It has
been noted that in recent decades, the barriers between borrowers and lenders in the
United States have been reduced, technology has improved, and competition from
alternative intermediaries has grown, including peer-to-peer lending, private equity,
pension funds, and securitization.114 These forces, combined with the consolidation
within the banking industry, have caused community banks to lose ground in both
deposits and lending.115
Despite these challenges, community banks remain important to consumers who
prefer the relationship-banking model to the transactional-banking model. In
addition, community banks are vital to the American economy because they
provide financial services and credit to customers who are less attractive to larger
financial institutions by virtue of their location or the profitability of the financial
products they need.116 Community banks are particularly important to small
businesses, farmers, commercial real-estate owners, and individuals.

108. Hein et al., supra note 90, at 17 n.2.
109. FDIC COMMUNITY BANKING STUDY, supra note 20, at 4-1.
110. Id. at 4-3 to 4-7.
111. Id. at 4-2.
112. Id. (“Because of their heavy dependence on lending as a source of income,
community banks have been disproportionately affected by the long-term trend toward lower
net interest margins.”).
113. See Franklin Allen & Anthony M. Santomero, What Do Financial Intermediaries
Do?, 25 J. BANKING & FIN. 271, 289 (2001).
114. Id. at 274–78.
115. Noncommunity banks have been able to “shift[] from traditional intermediation
functions to fee-producing activities” and therefore increase noninterest income. Id. at 279.
116. See, e.g., George, supra note 104, at 5 (“[C]ommunity banks fulfill a very important
function in establishing close relationships and directing credit to customers whose needs
might otherwise go unserved.”).
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1. Small-Business Lending
Small businesses drive the American economy.117 Small businesses accounted
for 63% of the net new jobs created between 1993 and mid-2013.118 Policy makers
on both sides of the aisle agree that small businesses are the “engine of job creation
in America” and, therefore, vital to the economic recovery.119
Small businesses depend on community banks for basic financial services and
for the credit to fuel their investment and job-creation efforts. Community banks
provide banking services to small businesses—such as deposit taking, checking
accounts, and payroll services—while also functioning as a funding source for
working capital, expansion loans, and even start-up costs.120
At year-end 2013, U.S. commercial banks had $269 billion in outstanding
small-business loans, which were secured by nonfarm, nonresidential properties
with an original amount of $1 million or less.121 Community banks held 38.2% of

117. As of 2008, small businesses accounted for 46% of private, nonfarm gross domestic
product (GDP), meaning that almost half of all production in the United States came from
small businesses. KATHRYN KOBE, U.S. SMALL BUS. ADMIN., SMALL BUSINESS GDP: UPDATE
2002–2010 (2012), available at http://www.sba.gov/sites/default/files/rs390_1.pdf. Small
businesses also provide half of all employment in the United States and 43% of total U.S.
payroll spending. See Historical Data Tabulations by Enterprise Size–2010, U.S. CENSUS
BUREAU, http://www.census.gov//econ/susb/data/susb2010.html.
118. The Small Business Administration Office of Advocacy defines a “small business”
as an independent business with fewer than five hundred employees. In 2011, there were
28.2 million small businesses and 17,700 firms with five hundred employees or more.
OFFICE OF ADVOCACY, SMALL BUS. ADMIN., FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS (2014),
available at http://www.sba.gov/sites/default/files/FAQ_March_2014_0.pdf.
119. Christine Lagorio-Chafkin, Cory Booker: Start-Ups Will Define America’s Future,
INC.COM (Mar. 21, 2013), http://www.inc.com/christine-lagorio/cory-booker-sxsw-start-ups
-and-the-future.html (observation by Newark’s then-Mayor Cory Booker); see also Letter from
John Boehner, Republican Leader, Eric Cantor, Republican Whip, Mike Pence, Republican
Conference Chairman & Dave Camp, Ways & Means Ranking Member, U.S. House of
Representatives, to Barack Obama, President of the U.S. (Dec. 9, 2009), available at
http://kingston.house.gov/uploadedfiles/gop_solutions_for_america_jobs.pdf (“The truth of the
matter is that small business, not government, is the engine of job creation in America.”).
120. See WILLIAM J. DENNIS, JR., NFIB RESEARCH FOUND., FINANCING SMALL BUSINESSES:
SMALL BUSINESS AND CREDIT ACCESS 20 (2011), available at http://www.nfib.com
/Portals/0/PDF/AllUsers/research/studies/Small-Business-Credit-Access-NFIB.pdf (“The best
predictor of a small employer’s success obtaining a new credit line is the firm’s credit score. . . .
A second predictor is whether the small employer considers a $100 billion bank his principal
financial institution. If the owner does, the chances that he will be successful, all factors equal,
are only one-quarter of that had his primary bank been smaller or he did not have one.”
(citation omitted)).
121. See FDIC Statistics Report, supra note 12. To review the statistics discussed in this
subpart, launch the URL, click “Custom Download,” and select the relevant field—such as
“Small Business Loans” or “Net Loans and Leases”—from the drop-down box. Select the
reports you are interested in via the checkboxes, click “Next,” and then proceed to enter your
delimiting factors on the “Download Selection” screen. After that, click “Find”: you can then
download a customized spreadsheet containing the data you’ve requested.
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that sum on their books.122
Community banks hold a small-business loan portfolio over four times their
relative size in terms of assets.123 With respect to small-business loans with original
principal amounts of less than $100,000, their participation is even more striking—
61.7%, or 7.3 times their share of total assets.124 It is not surprising that community
banks dominate small-business lending, because the informationally opaque nature
of small businesses makes them a natural fit for relationship banking.
2. Farm and Farmland Lending
Community banks are absolutely vital to the economic health of rural America
and to the agricultural economy.125 Farmers rely on community banks as sources of
both short-term credit for crop production (farm loans) and long-term financing
secured by mortgages on agricultural real estate (farmland loans). As of year-end
2013, community banks held 60.8% of all farmland loans.126 These holdings
included 74.3% of farmland loans less than $500,000 and 80.5% of farmland loans
less than $100,000.127 Community banks also held 54.9% of farm loans, including
75.9% of all farm loans less than $500,000 and 78.5% of farm loans less than
$100,000.128 In other words, community banks had 7 to 9.5 times the level of
investment in loans to farmers as their relative asset size.
The disproportionate share of farm and farmland lending held by community
banks suggests that they are particularly adept at serving the needs of farming
families. Lack of substitutes for the banking services provided to rural areas further
emphasizes the important role of community banks in farm lending.129 With less
than a 30% share of banking offices in rural areas, larger banks tend to be more
geographically distant from farming operations.130 As a result, large banks incur
more monitoring costs when lending to smaller borrowers such as farms and rural
small businesses.131 Because farm loans are more costly to larger banks, these banks

122. Community banks held $103 billion. See id.
123. Community banks held 8.4% of total assets, compared to 38% of small-business
loans. See id.
124. Community banks held $9.3 billion of $15 billion in total loans in this category. See id.
125. See, e.g., LAWSKY, supra note 73, at 4 (“New York’s farms, which have little or no
access to large banks, rely heavily on community banks for loans and other financial services.”).
126. See FDIC Statistics Report, supra note 12. “Farmland loans” are described in the
FDIC reports as “[l]oans secured by farmland held in domestic offices.”
127. See id.
128. See id. “Farm loans” are described in the FDIC reports as “[l]oans to finance
agricultural production and other loans to farmers.”
129. See William Keeton, Jim Harvey & Paul Willis, The Role of Community Banks in
the U.S. Economy, 88 FED. RES. BANK KAN. CITY ECON. REV., no. 2, 2003, at 15, 26–27.
130. See FDIC COMMUNITY BANKING STUDY, supra note 20, at 3-6 tbl.3.5.
131. Agricultural financing can be an underwriting-intensive operation where local
knowledge and understanding of the market can be expensive to duplicate. Lenders use both
quantitative data points, such as debt-to-asset ratio and profit margin, and qualitative factors
to assess risk. See, e.g., Steven C. Blank, Financing Agricultural Operations: The Loan
Process in California, U. CAL. COOPERATIVE EXTENSION, http://sfp.ucdavis.edu
/pubs/SFNews/Aug-Sept97/finance_510/ (last updated June 15, 2012) (“The qualitative
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are less willing to extend credit. Consequently, there is little evidence that larger
banks would be willing or able to substitute for the local-farm lending practiced by
smaller community banks, particularly with respect to low-balance loans.132
3. Commercial Real-Estate Lending
At year-end 2013, U.S. commercial banks carried $1.01 trillion in commercial
real-estate (CRE) loans on their books.133 CRE includes nonfarm, nonresidential
property types such as offices, retail shopping centers, industrial and warehouse
buildings, and multifamily residential properties. Community banks held $227
billion, or 22.4% of those loans.134
The composition of loan portfolios held by community banks has changed
significantly over the past quarter decade. Approximately 75% of loans on the
books of community banks at year-end 2013 were primarily secured by real
estate.135 It is important to note that not all loans secured by CRE are for the
acquisition or development of income-producing CRE assets like office buildings,
shopping centers, or residential subdivisions. Many business loans are at least
partially secured by a mortgage on the real estate owned by that business.136
Community banks are the primary, and often the only, lenders willing to finance
CRE acquisition and development projects and properties in tertiary markets and
rural areas. The other major providers of credit to CRE borrowers—life insurance
companies, commercial mortgage-backed securities lenders, and private
investors—are focused almost exclusively on large, high-quality properties in the

factors considered in loan analysis were reported to be management ability, character,
reputation, credit history, risk factors, appearance of the farm, good records and financial
data, asset quality, analysis of the industry, and a farmer’s knowledge of his business.
Obviously, the factors on this list are not mutually exclusive. When asked to elaborate on
what to look for when judging management ability, the lenders again mentioned the
appearance of the farm, the borrower’s knowledge, the quality of financial data submitted as
well as production and financial history. . . . Seventy-five percent of the lenders said ‘yes’
when asked whether the riskiness of the commodities produced by the borrower alters the
loan process. They reported that risk could make a difference because underwriting
standards (especially the loan-to-value ratio) can become stricter on risky commodities.”).
132. See AM. BANKERS ASS’N, 2013 FARM BANK PERFORMANCE REPORT 4, available at
http://www.aba.com/Press/Documents/2013FarmBankPerformancereport.pdf (describing the
performance of 2152 “farm banks,” banks whose “ratio of domestic farm loans to total
domestic loans [is] greater than or equal to the industry average”). The figure cited by the
ABA includes thirty-eight banks with assets greater than $1 billion, but the median-sized
farm bank has $102 million in assets. Id.
133. See FDIC Statistics Report, supra note 12. CRE loans are defined as nonresidential
loans secured by real estate, excluding farm loans.
134. See id.
135. See id.
136. These “fixed asset” loans are particularly useful to small businesses that are less
transparent or difficult to underwrite because the principal data source used by the lender is the
value of the real estate pledged as collateral. Allen N. Berger & Lamont K. Black, Bank Size,
Lending Technologies, and Small Business Finance, 35 J. BANKING & FIN. 724, 726 (2011).
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most densely populated regions.137 But small CRE properties make up the lion’s
share of U.S. CRE, and they are primarily financed by community banks.138
The kind of CRE that community banks support with credit is integral to the
success of small businesses. From the perspective of tenants, the CRE sector is a
financing mechanism of equal importance to a line of credit.139 Businesses that
choose to lease the premises from which they operate have the flexibility to employ
capital in the acquisition of equipment or payroll. If the CRE sector did not exist,
many other small businesses that could not afford to purchase their own building
would also not exist.
4. Residential Mortgage Lending
Home ownership is an essential element of the American Dream and a vital part
of the American economy. The U.S. government has encouraged home ownership
for decades through various economic and tax policies.140 The prevailing policy
theory is that home ownership creates more stable neighborhoods, better
environments for children, and less crime because home owners are more
protective, more involved in their communities, and more familiar with their
neighbors than are renters. On a personal level, home ownership is a primary way for
individuals to build wealth. According to the Federal Reserve, homes constitute 32%
of total family assets, establishing a borrowing base and an appreciable asset.141
Community banks have historically been an important source of credit for
residential homebuyers. In 1984, residential real-estate loans represented 61% of all
loans at community banks.142 But the rise of mortgage securitization and the
tightening of consumer protections related to residential real-estate lending have
dramatically decreased the involvement of community banks in residential
real-estate lending. By year-end 2013, residential real-estate loans had dropped to
26% of all community-bank loans.143 The ratio of residential real-estate loans held

137. Tanya D. Marsh, Too Big To Fail vs. Too Small To Notice: Addressing the
Commercial Real Estate Debt Crisis, 63 ALA. L. REV. 321, 343 (2012).
138. Id. at 354.
139. See Commercial Real Estate’s Impact on Bank Stability: Hearing Before the Cong.
Oversight Panel, 112th Cong. 38 (2011) (prepared statement of Sandra Thompson, Director,
Division of Supervision and Consumer Protection, FDIC) (“Small businesses rely heavily on
commercial real estate to collateralize borrowings for working capital and other needs.”).
140. See, e.g., Dennis J. Ventry, Jr., The Accidental Deduction: A History and Critique of
the Tax Subsidy for Mortgage Interest, 73 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 233 (2010) (discussing
housing-related tax subsidies defended on homeownership grounds as early as the 1950s);
Robert B. Avery, Neil Bhutta, Kenneth P. Brevoort & Glenn B. Canner, The Mortgage
Market in 2010: Highlights from the Data Reported Under the Home Mortgage Disclosures
Act, FED. RES. BULL. (Fed. Reserve Sys., D.C.), Dec. 30, 2011, at 11 (indicating that nearly
50% of home-purchase loans in 2010 were government backed).
141. Mark Doms & Meryl Motika, The Rise in Homeownership, FRBSF ECON. LETTER (Fed.
Reserve Bank of S.F.), Nov. 3, 2006, at 1, available at http://www.frbsf.org/economic
-research/publications/economic-letter/2006/november/the-rise-in-homeownership/el2006-30.pdf.
142. FDIC COMMUNITY BANKING STUDY, supra note 20, at 5-1.
143. See FDIC Statistics Report, supra note 12.
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by community banks compared to all commercial banks has also markedly
declined, from 33% in 1993 to 14% in 2003 and 9% in 2013.144
At the same time, residential real-estate loans held by community banks were
more likely to be secured by first-mortgage liens than the riskier second-mortgage
liens, also known as home-equity loans. Community banks held 10.3% of
residential mortgages secured by a first lien, but only 4.8% of home-equity loans.145
The reluctance to make home-equity loans is reflected in the very low levels of
community bank unsecured lending to individuals (i.e., credit cards)—community
banks held only 2.7% of such loans held by commercial banks at year-end 2013.146
In 2012, Federal Reserve Governor Elizabeth Duke expressed concern that “new
mortgage lending regulations might . . . seriously impair the ability of community
banks to continue to offer their traditional mortgage products.”147 She argued that a
simpler regulatory structure should be adopted with respect to community-bank
mortgage lending,148 noting that community banks had proved to be much more
reliable underwriters than larger banks:
Over the last several years as mortgage delinquencies reached record
levels, the serious delinquency rate of mortgages held by community
banks did not go much over 4 percent, far lower than the serious
delinquency rates that climbed to almost 22 percent for subprime,
fixed-rate loans and more than 46 percent for subprime, variable-rate
loans. In fact, over the last several years, on average, mortgages held by
community banks outperformed even fixed-rate, prime loans, the best
performing mortgage category. I think this statistic by itself is a strong
testament to the responsible lending practices of community banks.149
Governor Duke concluded that “crafting a regulatory approach that is effective in
preventing abuse but that leaves room for traditional community bank lending is
challenging.”150
5. Retail Deposit Services
Retail deposit services are vital to the economy on several levels. First,
consumers and small businesses use deposit accounts to manage cash. Second,
deposits are low-cost, reliable sources of capital for banks.151 By virtue of their
emphasis on core banking services, it is not surprising that community banks are
strong providers of retail deposit services. Retail deposits include transaction
accounts, such as checking accounts, and nontransaction accounts like savings

144. See id.
145. See id.
146. See id.
147. Duke, supra note 30, at 5.
148. Id. at 15.
149. Id. at 13.
150. Id. at 14.
151. Timothy Clark, Astrid Dick, Beverly Hirtle, Kevin J. Stiroh & Robard Williams, The
Role of Retail Banking in the U.S. Banking Industry: Risk, Return, and Industry Structure,
FED. RES. BANK N.Y. ECON. POL’Y REV., Dec. 2007, at 39, 42.
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accounts and certificates of deposit.152 Where providing credit and loans is the core
retail-banking activity on the asset side of a bank balance sheet, deposit taking is
the core activity on the liability side of the balance sheet.153
At year-end 2013, U.S. commercial banks held approximately $8 trillion in
retail deposits.154 Community banks held approximately $893 billion of those retail
deposits, representing an 11% share.155 In rural areas, where customers have fewer
brick-and-mortar banking options, community banks hold 70% of retail deposits, or
8.3 times their relative share of total assets.156
Community banks also play a significant relative role in deposit accounts held
by states and other political subdivisions (other than the federal government),
holding 18% of such deposits.157 Community banks also held 16.6% of transaction
accounts held by individuals, partnerships, and corporations.158
To summarize, community banks held only 8.4% of total commercial-bank
assets as of December 31, 2013, but they represented an outsized share of certain
important categories of financial services:









38% of small-business loans
62% of small-business loans less than $100,000
61% of farmland loans
55% of farm loans
22% of commercial real-estate loans
10.3% of first-mortgage residential real-estate loans
18% of deposit accounts for state and other political subdivisions
17% of transaction accounts for individuals, partnerships, and
corporations
 11% of core (retail) deposits159
C. Community Banks and the 2008 Financial Crisis
Congress enacted Dodd-Frank on January 5, 2010, and President Obama signed
it into law on July 21, 2010.160 Passed during the worst economic recession since

152. Id.
153. Id.
154. See FDIC Statistics Report, supra note 12. Here, retail deposits are defined as core
deposits held domestically, excluding time deposits (CDs) of more than $250,000 and
brokered deposits of $250,000 or less.
155. See id.
156. FDIC COMMUNITY BANKING STUDY, supra note 20, at 3-5.
157. See FDIC Statistics Report, supra note 12.
158. See id.
159. See id.
160. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203,
124 Stat. 1376 (2010); DAVIS POLK & WARDWELL LLP, SUMMARY OF THE DODD-FRANK WALL
STREET REFORM AND CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT, at i (2010), available at
http://www.davispolk.com/files/Publication/7084f9fe-6580-413b-b870-b7c025ed2ecf
/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/1d4495c7-0be0-4e9a-ba77-f786fb90464a/070910
_Financial_Reform_Summary.pdf.
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the Great Depression, the legislation was intended to remedy problems in the
financial-services sector that the Democratic majority in Congress believed caused
the 2008 financial crisis. There is compelling evidence that community banks did
not participate in subprime lending, securitization, or derivatives trading161—three
of the primary causes of the 2008 financial crisis, according to the authors of
Dodd-Frank.162 Many provisions of the Act, however, apply to both large, complex
financial institutions and community banks.
1. Subprime Lending
Community banks participate in the U.S. residential mortgage market through
their role as relationship bankers. At the end of 2013, community banks held about
9% of loans secured by mortgages on single-family residences—about the same
proportion as total banking assets held.163 Many customers obtain mortgage loans
from banks that satisfy their other financial needs. For example, if a customer has
checking and money-market accounts at Small Town Community Bank, then that
customer is most likely to look first at Small Town Community Bank for a
mortgage loan because that customer is most comfortable with Small Town and the
Small Town bankers understand that customer’s personal financial circumstances.
Because of this personal familiarity, a small, informationally opaque borrower may
also be more likely to obtain a loan from a small community bank than from a
large, data-driven lender.
Much of recent U.S. economic policy promoted homeownership as a method for
Americans to build wealth.164 Entire ancillary, and heretofore nonexistent,
industries sprung up around the housing market as a result. To get as many U.S.
consumers into homes as possible, some mortgage originators used innovative and
risky loan arrangements.165 Prior to the housing bubble, most mortgage lending was
performed similar to the way community banks practice relationship banking. That
is, lenders wanted to know their customer, know their customer’s creditworthiness,
and ensure that mortgages held on the lenders’ books would not default. By
contrast, due to a disconnect between incentives and consequences, subprime
mortgage originators were more focused on short-term results, including earning
fees and feeding the mortgage-securitization pipeline.166

161. There remains passionate disagreement about what caused the financial crisis. For
the purposes of this Article, I do not believe it is important to determine or discuss what
actually caused the financial crisis, but I refer to the thinking of those who drafted the
legislation and what they hoped to accomplish through Dodd-Frank.
162. See FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT, supra note 23, at xvii.
163. See FDIC Statistics Report, supra note 12; see also supra notes 49, 144 and
accompanying text.
164. U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., URBAN POLICY BRIEF: HOMEOWNERSHIP AND
ITS BENEFITS (1995), available at http://www.huduser.org/publications/txt/hdbrf2.txt.
165. See Press Release, Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, Consumer Financial Protection
Bureau Issues Rule To Protect Consumers from Irresponsible Mortgage Lending (Jan. 10,
2013), available at http://www.consumerfinance.gov/newsroom/consumer-financial-protection
-bureau-issues-rule-to-protect-consumers-from-irresponsible-mortgage-lending/.
166. FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, PRELIMINARY STAFF REPORT: SECURITIZATION AND THE
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The authors of Dodd-Frank cited residential subprime mortgage lending as a
precipitating cause of the 2008 financial crisis.167 Although there is no official
definition of a subprime loan, it is usually understood to be a mortgage loan made
to a borrower with a poor or limited credit history.168 Popular references to
“subprime lending” typically include alt-A loans.169 These loans are generally made
to borrowers with strong credit scores but have other characteristics that make the
loans riskier.170 For example, the lender may have no or limited documentation of a
borrower’s income, there may be a high loan-to-value ratio, or the secured property
may be for investment rather than a primary residence.171 Alt-A loans once made
up a modest percentage of the residential mortgage market, often used by people
who were self-employed. Because subprime and alt-A loans are riskier to lenders
than are prime loans—those made to borrowers with strong credit scores and few
risk factors—the market permits lenders to charge higher interest rates and/or fees
on subprime and alt-A loans.172
In 1990, subprime loans totaled $37 billion, or 9% of residential mortgage
originations.173 As home values increased and interest rates dropped, the pace of
residential lending exploded. At the peak of the market in 2005, subprime loans
totaled $625 billion, or 25% of all residential mortgage originations.174 In 2006,
alt-A and subprime loans combined to constitute 40% of all origination activity.175
This origination volume was made possible because the vast majority of these loans
were quickly pooled into mortgage-backed securities (MBS) and repooled into
collateralized-debt obligations (CDOs), and the default risk was transferred from
the originators to securities investors.176
As the volume of subprime and alt-A mortgages increased to meet investor
demand for MBS and CDOs, the number of Americans with a home to mortgage or
refinance did not substantially increase. As a result, underwriting standards were
further relaxed, and many borrowers with limited abilities to repay obtained
mortgages.177 When home values stopped rising, however, homeowners began to
default at unprecedented numbers—curtailing the cash flow underlying many MBS

MORTGAGE CRISIS 19 (2010) [hereinafter SECURITIZATION PRELIMINARY REPORT], available at
http://fcic-static.law.stanford.edu/cdn_media/fcic-reports/2010-0407-Preliminary_Staff_Report
_-_Securitization_and_the_Mortgage_Crisis.pdf.
167. FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT, supra note 23, at xxiii–xxiv.
168. FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, PRELIMINARY STAFF REPORT: THE MORTGAGE CRISIS
5 (2010) [hereinafter MORTGAGE CRISIS PRELIMINARY REPORT], available at
http://fcic-static.law.stanford.edu/cdn_media/fcic-reports/2010-0407-PSR_-_The_Mortgage
_Crisis.pdf.
169. Id. at 6.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, What Is a Subprime Mortgage?,
CONSUMERFINANCE.GOV (Mar. 22, 2012), http://www.consumerfinance.gov/askcfpb/110
/what-is-a-subprime-mortgage.html.
173. MORTGAGE CRISIS PRELIMINARY REPORT, supra note 168, at 8.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. See SECURITIZATION PRELIMINARY REPORT, supra note 166, at 19.
177. See FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT, supra note 23, at xxvi.
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and related CDOs, and creating a cascade of defaults throughout the financial
system.178
The origination of subprime mortgage loans for securitization, with
underwriting decoupled from credit risk, was clearly a significant problem that
fueled the housing bubble and destroyed much household wealth. However, it is
equally clear that community banks did not participate in that activity.179
Community banks did make loans that are technically “subprime,” but the
existence of subprime loans themselves was not the problem; subprime loans, when
properly underwritten, can still perform. Community banks have stronger
incentives to effectively underwrite loans than do originators of loans destined for
the secondary market for several reasons:
When savers, borrowers, and lenders all live in the same community,
lenders don’t write loans that amount to financial crack. They know
their business depends on their good reputation. Similarly, borrowers,
who prize the good opinion of their neighbors, don’t easily walk away
from their loans.
In small-scale banking . . . borrowers and lenders can effectively see
one another. They’re rich with what Federal Reserve Chairman Ben
Bernanke calls “informational capital,” and this has a stabilizing
influence.180
Between 1996 and 2006, residential mortgages originated and held by
community banks outperformed residential mortgages in general. The net
charge-off rate at community banks was only 0.06%.181 The same rate at
noncommunity banks was 0.11–0.12%.182
Remarkably, this trend is magnified when comparing net charge-off rates at
community and noncommunity banks for the period from 2006 to 2010, when
mortgage defaults ballooned. During that period, charge-off rates averaged 0.35%
at community banks versus 1.16% at noncommunity banks.183 That is, the
charge-off rate was 3.3 times higher for noncommunity banks than for community
banks during that period.184

178. Id. at 27.
179. In fact, loans that promoted the financial crisis were “primarily being made outside
the regular banking system.” Joseph R. Mason, Robert Kulick & Hal J. Singer, The
Economic Impact of Eliminating Preemption of State Consumer Protection Laws, 12 U. PA.
J. BUS. L. 781, 791 (2010) (quoting Barney Frank, Chairman, House Comm. on Fin. Servs.,
The “Loan Arrangers” Will Not Ride Again, Speech Before the National Press Club (July
27, 2009)). Treasury research determined that 94% of “high-priced loans” to “lower income
borrowers” were originated by nonbank entities. Id. (quoting DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, A
NEW FOUNDATION: REBUILDING FINANCIAL SUPERVISION AND REGULATION 69–70 (2009),
available at http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/Documents/FinalReport_web.pdf).
180. Phillip Longman & T.A. Frank, Too Small To Fail, WASH. MONTHLY, Nov.–Dec.
2008, at 14, 16.
181. FDIC COMMUNITY BANKING STUDY, supra note 20, at 4-6.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. The backlog in foreclosures and mortgage workouts is well known. CoreLogic, an
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With total residential mortgage defaults at community banks making up only 2%
of all defaults between 2003 and 2010, it is clear that community banks were very
minor players in the subprime lending market on absolute and relative levels.
2. Securitization
The authors of Dodd-Frank also identified securitization of subprime residential
mortgages as a leading cause of the 2008 financial crisis. Although community
banks do extend residential mortgages that may meet some of the characteristics of
subprime loans, they tend to hold those loans on their books and retain the risk.185
In securitization, an originator pools a large number of debt instruments
(mortgages, car loans, student loans, etc.) into a single security, then sells interests
in that security to investors.186 The resulting securities are generally known as
“asset-backed securities,” although sponsors typically focus a particular security on
a specific type of collateral.187 Banks and financial institutions safely engaged in
securitization prior to the 2008 financial crisis. Securitization is not inherently
risky; rather, it is a valuable tool for mitigating risk and supplying additional credit
into the economy.188 Prior to the 2008 financial crisis, mortgage-backed securities
were popular investments for investors who sought a low-risk investment, because
residential mortgages had very low historic rates of default. During the 2008
financial crisis, however, it became clear that a housing bubble had developed and
that securities based on residential mortgages made at the height of that bubble
were far riskier than investors believed.

analytics firm, estimates that a $246 billion shadow inventory remained in the housing
market as of August 2012. Agustino Fontevecchia, What Housing Recovery? Distressed
Sales Still High, Shadow Inventory Massive, FORBES (Aug. 28, 2012, 6:57 PM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/afontevecchia/2012/08/28/what-housing-recovery-distressed
-sales-still-high-shadow-inventory-massive/.
185. Duke, supra note 30, at 6–7 (“Community banks have long been a source of loans
that, for a variety of reasons, do not fit the parameters of conforming government-sponsored
enterprise loans or eligibility for government-guaranteed programs. Community banks
typically hold these loans on their own balance sheets. They use higher interest rates to
compensate for the lack of liquidity in these loans or to cover higher processing costs
because community banks lack economies of scale, and they use balloon payments as a
simple way to limit their interest-rate risk.”).
186. See SECURITIZATION PRELIMINARY REPORT, supra note 166, at 4.
187. Nonmortgage asset-backed securities fall into four main categories, based on the
type of collateral that secures the loans: consumer ABS (student loans, credit card
receivables, and auto loans); corporate ABS (corporate debt, collateralized-bond obligations,
collateralized-debt obligations, etc.); commercial ABS (trade receivables, etc.); and
whole-business ABS (franchise royalties, billboard leases, etc.). The best-known type of
asset-backed security is the mortgage-backed security. See GUGGENHEIM PARTNERS, LLC,
THE ABCS OF ABS: IDENTIFYING OPPORTUNITIES IN ASSET-BACKED SECURITIES 3 (2013),
available at http://guggenheimpartners.com/GP/media/pdf/The-ABCs-of-ABS.pdf.
188. Richard M. Hynes, Securitization, Agency Costs, and the Subprime Crisis, 4 VA. L.
& BUS. REV. 231, 236 (2009) (“If properly regulated, securitization may actually help
address two other possible causes of our recent housing troubles: the formation of market
bubbles and the moral hazard created by the ability of lenders to shift losses to taxpayers.”).
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Securitization is a process that is tailor-made for commodified, transactional
banking. As a result, a small number of institutions dominate originations. A 2011
study determined that 96% of all residential mortgage originations in 2006 were
carried out by forty lenders, and ten lenders were responsible for 65% of mortgage
originations.189
[B]ased on available estimates, approximately $25 trillion of
structured-finance securities and related derivatives were outstanding in
the U.S. financial markets at the peak of the credit boom in 2007.
Eighteen giant [financial institutions], including ten U.S. and eight
foreign financial institutions, originated the lion’s share of those
complex instruments. Structured-finance securities and related
derivatives not only financed but also far exceeded about $9 trillion of
risky private-sector debt that was outstanding in U.S. financial markets
when the credit crisis broke out.190
The growth of securitization has also allowed the largest banks to generate
significant fee income through various financial-intermediary roles.191 Fees
generated from securitization activities accounted for a tiny amount of noninterest
income for community banks between 2001 and 2011 but 8% of noninterest
income for noncommunity banks.192
3. Derivatives
According to the narrative adopted by the authors of Dodd-Frank,
over-the-counter trading of credit derivatives contributed to the 2008 financial
crisis in three primary ways.193 First, credit default swaps were marketed as
insurance against MBS loan losses, which encouraged investors to take more risk
without offsetting the risk.194 Second, the structure of a synthetic CDO—which
involves taking a speculative bet on the performance of MBS without actually

189. Richard Stanton, Johan Walden & Nancy Wallace, The Industrial Organization of
the U.S. Residential Mortgage Market, 6 ANN. REV. FIN. ECON. (forthcoming 2014)
(manuscript at 16), available at http://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/walden/HaasWebpage
/18._mortgageio.pdf. The top ten lenders in 2006 were Countrywide Financial, Wells Fargo
Home Mortgage, Washington Mutual, CitiMortgage Inc., Chase Home Finance, Bank of
America Mortgage & Affiliates, Wachovia Corporation, Residential Capital Group,
IndyMac, and GMAC Residential Holding Corporation. With the exception of GMAC, all of
these entities were either banks or thrifts. Id.
190. Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Dodd-Frank Act: A Flawed and Inadequate Response
to the Too-Big-To-Fail Problem, 89 OR. L. REV. 951, 966 (2011) (footnotes omitted).
191. See FDIC COMMUNITY BANKING STUDY, supra note 20, at 4-2; Katherine Samolyk,
The Future of Banking in America: The Evolving Role of Commercial Banks in U.S. Credit
Markets, 16 FDIC BANKING REV., no. 2, 2004, at 29, 30.
192. FDIC COMMUNITY BANKING STUDY, supra note 20, at 4-3.
193. See generally FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT, supra note 23, at 38–51, 127–55.
194. Id. at 50.
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owning any mortgages—requires the use of a credit default swap.195 Synthetic
CDOs allowed investors to multiply the number of bets on the same underlying
MBS, thereby exponentially increasing systemic credit exposure.196 Third, because
many different investors made bets on the same underlying MBS instruments, fear
of a contagion effect spread, causing panic in the markets and pressuring the
government to step in with assistance in order to restore liquidity in the system.197
The most fundamental problem with derivatives, according to the authors of
Dodd-Frank, was that they were essentially unregulated and opaque so that
regulators, shareholders, counterparties, and the general public could not accurately
assess individual or systemic risk.198
Even if we accept this narrative as correct, community banks were irrelevant to
the kinds of derivatives markets implicated in the 2008 financial crisis. Small banks
should be more likely to use derivatives to hedge risk, particularly interest-rate
risk.199 Prior to the enactment of Gramm-Leach-Bliley in 2001, community banks
were deterred from using derivatives to hedge because of their cost.200 Call reports
from 1999 show that less than one percent of community banks used derivatives
that year.201 Use of derivatives by small banks increased after 2001. In 2012, about
eighteen percent of community banks were active derivatives users.202 Moreover,
the interest-rate swaps used by some community banks are wholly unlike the
derivatives traded by large banks participating in the greater derivatives market.203
At no point between 2003 and 2010 did community-bank derivatives activity make
up more than a fraction of one percent of total banking-institution derivatives activity.
FDIC data on derivatives shows that the average notional value of derivatives held on
community-bank balance sheets constituted about one-tenth of one percent of all
derivatives held by all banking institutions between 2003 and 2010.204 Moreover,
community banks engaged in an insignificant amount of credit-derivatives trading.
Community banks held just 0.003% of all credit derivatives held by banking
institutions between 2003 and 2010.205

195. Id. 142; Michael Simkovic, Competition and Crisis in Mortgage Securitization, 88
IND. L.J. 213, 262 (2013) (“Synthetic CDOs provided investors with similar risk exposures
but did not actually fund any new mortgages. Rather than purchase MBS and thereby fund
mortgages, synthetic CDOs used credit default swaps to enable investors to make side bets
on the performance of existing MBS or CDOs.”)
196. FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT, supra note 23, at 145–46.
197. Id. at 226–28, 386.
198. Id. at 386.
199. Shen & Hartarska, supra note 31, at 2.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id. at 3.
203. Id. at 7–8 (explaining that speculative derivatives increased riskiness at banks, but
hedging derivatives, like interest-rate swaps, reduced risk).
204. See FDIC Statistics Report, supra note 12. This figure represents the sum of the
following: interest-rate contracts (defined as the notional value of interest-rate swap, futures,
forward, and option contracts); foreign-exchange-rate contracts; commodity contracts; and
equity contracts (defined similarly to interest-rate contracts).
205. See id.
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Community banks were not responsible for the causes of the 2008 financial
crisis as understood by the authors of Dodd-Frank. Community banks did not
engage in widespread subprime lending. They did not engage in securitization of
subprime residential mortgages. Nor did they use derivatives to engage in risky
speculation in order to maximize return. Richard Cordray, the director of the
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB), agreed with this analysis, telling a
group of community bankers that although community banks did not cause the
2008 financial crisis, these banks must “unfortunately” deal with regulations to
prevent another crisis.206
II. THE REGULATION OF COMMUNITY BANKS
A. Regulatory Structure
The American banking system and regulatory regime are significantly different
from those of other Western countries.207 The American system evolved
organically and in response to historical conditions and events, rather than as a
result of a deliberate planning process. In the very beginning, Alexander Hamilton
and Thomas Jefferson clashed over the structure of banking in the United States.208
Hamilton favored a federal bank and the establishment of a national currency.209
Jefferson advocated for a decentralized system in which the states chartered
banks.210 The ultimate result was the dual-banking system that we have today.
During the early days of the American republic, each state established its own
system for chartering banks.211 At the same time, the first Bank of the United
States was chartered by Congress in 1791.212 A bill to recharter the bank failed in
1811.213 As every lawyer who has taken constitutional law knows, the Second Bank
of the United States was chartered in 1816 by Congress.214 The State of Maryland,
in an effort to protect its own state-chartered banks, imposed a tax on the Second
Bank of the United States and challenged its right to exist under the Federal
Constitution. In M’Culloch v. Maryland,215 the Supreme Court struck down the tax

206. CMTY. BANKERS ASS’N OF ILL., CFPB DIRECTOR RICHARD CORDRAY MEETS WITH
CBAI BANKERS (2012), available at https://www.cbai.com/downloads/CFPB_Roundtable
_%20CBAI_E-News_12-21-2012.pdf.
207. Carl Felsenfeld & Genci Bilali, Is There a Dual Banking System?, 2 J. BUS.
ENTREPRENEURSHIP & L. 30, 53 (2008) (“The structure of the U.S. bank regulatory system is
unique in the world.”).
208. MICHAEL P. MALLOY, PRINCIPLES OF BANK REGULATION 4 (3d ed. 2011).
209. Id. at 3.
210. Jefferson and James Madison argued that Congress had no constitutional authority
to charter a bank. Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., Too Big To Fail, Too Few To Serve? The
Potential Risks of Nationwide Banks, 77 IOWA L. REV. 957, 970 (1992).
211. LISSA L. BROOME & JERRY W. MARKHAM, REGULATION OF BANK FINANCIAL
SERVICE ACTIVITIES: CASES AND MATERIALS 10 (4th ed. 2011) (North Carolina was the last
of the original thirteen states to establish a state-chartering system, in 1804).
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. Id. at 11.
215. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 425, 436 (1819).
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and determined that Congress did have the power to charter a bank. The Second
Bank of the United States was dissolved in 1836 when President Andrew Jackson
vetoed a bill to reestablish its charter.216 “The Jeffersonian and Jacksonian struggles
against the First and Second Banks reflected a deeply rooted popular hostility to
centralized financial power, particularly power licensed by the federal government.
The anti-Bank forces believed a decentralized, competitive system of state banks
was the only safe alternative to a national bank monopoly.”217
Following the demise of the Second Bank of the United States, a period known
as the Free Banking Era began. By 1860, nearly 1600 state-chartered banks were in
operation, each issuing its own paper currency.218
The need to finance the Civil War and to control the issuance of currency by a
myriad of state-chartered banks led to the 1863 National Currency Act, which
created a system of national banks and permitted them to issue a standard
currency.219 The next year, this legislation was replaced by the National Bank Act,
which began the process of establishing regulations for federally chartered
banks.220 Although these acts created a uniform national currency and limited the
issuance of bank notes to federally chartered banks, they did not create a strong
central banking system. The Civil War was thus the precipitating event for the
creation of the dual-banking system currently in effect.
Following the Panic of 1907, the next major development in American banking
history was the 1913 Federal Reserve Act, which split federal bank regulation
between the Treasury Department and the new Federal Reserve System.221 The
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency remained in charge of regulating national
banks, but the Federal Reserve was given responsibility for clearing checks.222 The
Federal Reserve Act also prohibited national banks from distributing their own
currency, and it restricted the issuance of notes to the Federal Reserve banks.223
In response to the Depression and the resulting widespread failure of banks, the
Banking Act of 1933 created a system of federal deposit insurance supported by the
FDIC.224 Also in 1933, the Glass-Steagall Act required the separation of investment
banks and commercial banks.225 In 1994, the Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and
Branching Efficiency Act allowed banks to establish nationwide interstate banking
for the first time.226 This was the enabling step in the rise of large, complex

216. BROOME & MARKHAM, supra note 211, at 11, 14–15.
217. Wilmarth, supra note 210, at 971.
218. BROOME & MARKHAM, supra note 211, at 15.
219. Id. at 22.
220. Id. at 23.
221. Federal Reserve Act, ch. 6, 38 Stat. 251 (1913) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 12 U.S.C.).
222. BROOME & MARKHAM, supra note 211, at 32.
223. Id. at 33.
224. Banking Act of 1933, ch. 89, 48 Stat. 162 (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 12 U.S.C.); see also BROOME & MARKHAM, supra note 211, at 38.
225. BROOME & MARKHAM, supra note 211, at 42–44.
226. Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994, Pub. L. No.
103-328, 108 Stat. 2338 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.); see also
BROOME & MARKHAM, supra note 211, at 54–55.
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financial institutions. In 1999, the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act repealed portions of
the Glass-Steagall Act and allowed bank holding companies to own both
investment banks and commercial banks.227 The PATRIOT Act,228 a response to the
September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, and the 2002 Sarbanes-Oxley Act,229 a
response to the Enron/WorldCom scandals, resulted in additional regulations for
banks. In 2010, the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act,
the most significant alteration to banking regulation since 1933, was enacted.230
This brief history of the American system of banking regulation illustrates the
legislative pattern of regulation by accretion. Following major events in our
nation’s history, such as the War of 1812, the Civil War, the Panic of 1907, the
Depression, September 11th, and the 2008 financial crisis, major changes have
taken place in the regulatory structure. This has led to a highly fractured system of
banking regulation.
In the American dual-banking regulatory structure, there are three broad
categories of regulation: chartering, supervision, and examination.
Banks may be chartered by either states or the federal government.231
State-chartered banks are subject to the regulation and supervision of the state in
which they were chartered. However, state-chartered banks remain subject to
supervision and examination by one or more federal agencies.232
There are four main federal regulatory agencies for financial institutions: the
OCC, which is part of the Department of the Treasury; the Federal Reserve; the
FDIC; and the National Credit Union Administration.233 Of these, only the OCC,
the Federal Reserve, and the FDIC regulate banks.
Banks may be members of the Federal Reserve system. The Federal Reserve
Board is the primary supervisor of state-chartered banks that are members of the
Federal Reserve. State banks that are not members of the Fed are primarily
supervised by the FDIC.234 National banks are primarily supervised by the OCC.235
In addition, Dodd-Frank created the CFPB, which has concurrent supervisory
authority over banks with more than $10 billion in assets.236
American banks are therefore subject to regulation, supervision, and inspection
by a variety of state and federal agencies. Banking regulations generally fall into

227. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (1999).
228. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required To
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT ACT) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56,
115 Stat. 272 (2001).
229. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
230. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No.
111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010).
231. Henry N. Butler & Jonathan R. Macey, The Myth of Competition in the Dual
Banking System, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 677, 677 (1988).
232. BROOME & MARKHAM, supra note 211, at 185.
233. MALLOY, supra note 208, at 28–42.
234. BROOME & MARKHAM, supra note 211, at 185.
235. MALLOY, supra note 208, at 28, 31, 36.
236. BROOME & MARKHAM, supra note 211, at 66, 370.
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four categories.237 First, regulators are concerned with protecting the safety and
soundness of deposits.238 This is the primary concern of the FDIC, although other
regulatory agencies are also concerned with safety and soundness.239 Second,
regulators are concerned with reducing systemic risk, that is, the risk of disruption
to the financial system and the broader economy as a result of one or more major
bank failures.240 Reducing systemic risk was a major concern of the authors of
Dodd-Frank. Third, regulators focus on preventing the misuse of banks, specifically
the risk that banks will be used to further criminal endeavors such as laundering
money.241 The PATRIOT Act was particularly concerned with preventing the use of
American banks to fund and further terrorist activities. Finally, regulators are focused
on consumer protection and equality of access to credit and other banking services.242
Another primary goal of Dodd-Frank was to promote consumer protection, and much
legislation over the past thirty years has focused on similar issues.243
The Federal Reserve alone administers an alphabet soup of regulations that are
concerned with monetary policy and reserve requirements, consumer protection,
payment systems, and securities credit transactions. As of December 31, 2013,
Federal Reserve regulations A through YY had been established.244 Each of these
regulations imposes detailed requirements on banks, and there is a significant
compliance cost associated with understanding and implementing the banks’
responsibilities under each of these regulations.
The American banking sector is a highly regulated segment of the American
economy, and that regulatory system has evolved in response to historical events
and crises that demanded solutions to specific problems. The variety of state and

237. See generally KENNETH SPONG, BANKING REGULATION: ITS PURPOSES,
IMPLEMENTATION, AND EFFECTS (5th ed. 2000), available at http://www.kansascityfed.org
/publicat/bankingregulation/RegsBook2000.pdf.
238. See generally id. at 6–7, 63–144.
239. Id. at 56.
240. Id. at 7–8.
241. See, e.g., Bank Secrecy Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-508, 84 Stat. 1114.
242. SPONG, supra note 237, at 10–11, 201–52.
243. See, e.g., Truth in Savings Act, Pub. L. No. 102-242, §§ 261–74, 105 Stat. 2236,
2334–43 (1991) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 4301–13 (2012)); Expedited Funds
Availability Act, Pub. L. No. 100-86, §§ 601–613, 101 Stat. 552, 635–52 (1987) (codified as
amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 4001–4010 (2012)); Electronic Fund Transfer Act, Pub. L. No.
95-630, §§ 901–921, 92 Stat. 3641, 3728–41 (1978) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§§ 1693–1693r (2012)); Community Reinvestment Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-128,
§§ 801–806, 91 Stat. 1111, 1147–48 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 2901–2905
(2012)); Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, Pub. L. No. 95-109, 91 Stat. 874 (1977)
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692–1692o (2012)); Home Mortgage Disclosure Act
of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-200, §§ 301–310, 89 Stat. 1124, 1125–28 (codified as amended at
12 U.S.C. §§ 2801–2809 (2012)); Equal Credit Opportunity Act, Pub. L. No. 93-495,
§§ 701–707, 88 Stat. 1500, 1521–25 (1974) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1691–
1691e (2012)); Fair Credit Reporting Act, Pub. L. No. 91-508, §§ 601–622, 84 Stat. 1114,
1128–36 (1970); Truth in Lending Act, Pub. L. No. 90-321, §§ 101–145, 82 Stat. 146, 146–
59 (1968) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
244. Regulations, BOARD GOVERNORS FED. RES. SYS., http://www.federalreserve.gov
/bankinforeg/reglisting.htm.
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federal regulators, the sheer volume of regulations applicable to banks, and the
complexity of the supervision and examination system result in significant
compliance costs. For typical American community banks, which engage in
traditional banking activities in a limited geographic area, many of these costs are
disproportionate to the risks posed by these banks to the American economy and
the American consumer.
It was against this fragmented backdrop that Dodd-Frank was enacted in 2010.
B. Residential Lending: An Example of Disclosure Fatigue
Even before Dodd-Frank was enacted, a variety of state and federal regulators
had imposed numerous disclosure and reporting requirements on banks in the name
of consumer protection.245 While consumer protection is a laudable goal, it is
arguable that the sheer volume and complexity of these disclosure requirements
actually undermine the goals of consumer protection, because the average
consumer neither reads nor fully understands the documentation required.246
Residential lending provides a good example. To obtain a first-mortgage
residential home loan at a community bank in Florida,247 a customer must first fill
out a seventy-page loan application package. The documentation contained in this
package includes the following:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)

(8)

A four-page “Uniform Residential Loan Application” on Freddie
Mac Form 65 7/05 (revised 6/09)
A three-page “Good Faith Estimate” form developed by the U.S.
Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD)
A one-page document detailing the “Good Faith Addendum Lock-In
Agreement and Application Fees”
A one-page “Truth-in-Lending Disclosure”
A one-page disclosure of the “Itemization of Amount Financed”
A one-page “Hazard Insurance Closing Requirements Advance
Notice”
A one-page document containing “Certifications, Disclosures, and
Notices” acknowledging that the applicant is aware of the Equal
Credit Opportunity Act, the Fair Credit Reporting Act, anticoercion
requirements under state and federal law, and the Right to Financial
Privacy Act of 1978
A one-page disclosure informing the customer that she has a right to

245. Congress specifically empowered the CFPB with ensuring that consumer disclosures
are “fully, accurately, and effectively disclosed to consumers in a manner that permits
consumers to understand the costs, benefits, and risks associated with the product or
service . . . .” 12 U.S.C § 5532(a) (2012).
246. Jean Braucher, Form and Substance in Consumer Financial Protection, 7 BROOK. J.
CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 107, 124 (2012) (“[R]egulation by disclosure often fails to work for an
array of reasons. Complexity and variety prevent transparency. Even when creditors try to
explain complex features, they cannot always get through to consumers.” (footnote omitted)).
247. The documents described in this subpart were provided to the author by Eddie
Creamer, president and CEO of Prosperity Bank in St. Augustine, Florida.
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receive a copy of an appraisal, several notices regarding the
appraisal, the disclosure of the Flood Disaster Protection Act of
1973, an acknowledgment that the consumer has received the HUD
booklet titled “Settlement Costs,” an acknowledgment that the
customer has received a booklet titled “Consumer Handbook on
Adjustable Mortgages” published by the Federal Reserve Board and
the Office of Thrift Supervision, and a Fair Lending Notice required
by the Housing Financial Discrimination Act of 1977
A one-page “Servicing Disclosure Statement”
A one-page Internal Revenue Service Form 4506-T, “Request for
Transcript of Tax Return”
A one-page “Borrower’s Certification and Authorization”
A two-page list of settlement providers in accordance with section
3500.7 of HUD’s Regulation X (RESPA)
A one-page “Appraisal Fee Authorization”
A forty-eight-page document prepared by HUD, entitled “Shopping
for Your Home Loan: HUD’s Settlement Cost Booklet”

In total, the customer applying for the loan must sign her name fourteen times
and theoretically read seventy pages of disclosures, warnings, and references to
dozens of laws.
If the customer is approved for the loan, then she receives a sixty-eight-page
packet of documents at closing to read and execute. The typical bank-closing
package includes the following documents:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)

(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
(9)
(10)
(11)
(12)
(13)
(14)
(15)
(16)
(17)

A three-page promissory note (Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac have
promulgated promissory note forms that are generally utilized for
residential mortgage loans)
A five-page amortization schedule
A three-page settlement statement on a form created by HUD
A thirteen-page mortgage, normally on a state-specific form labeled
as the “Fannie Mae/Freddie Mac Uniform Instrument for
Single-Family Loans”
A three-page “Planned Unit Development Rider” (if applicable),
identified as the “Multistate PUD Rider Single-Family Fannie
Mae/Freddie Mac Uniform Instrument”
A one-page “Escrow Waiver and Disclosure”
A one-page “Truth-in-Lending Disclosure”
A one-page disclosure of the “Itemization of Amount Financed”
A one-page “First Payment Letter”
A one-page “Signature/Name Affidavit”
A one-page “Affidavit of Occupancy”
A one-page “Occupancy Affidavit and Employment Certification”
A two-page bank privacy disclosure
A one-page “Borrower’s Certification and Authorization”
A one-page USA Patriot Act compliance document
A one-page disclosure of “Real Estate Tax Information”
The customer’s four-page “Uniform Residential Loan Application”
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so the customer can recertify that all information in the application is
correct as of the closing date
A two-page “Real Estate Loan Commitment Letter”
A one-page temporary payment coupon
A one-page mailing address information form
A one-page “Closing Agent/Notary Public Certification Customer
Identification Program” affidavit
IRS Form W-9 “Request for Taxpayer Identification Number and
Certification”
A second copy of IRS Form 4506-T “Request for Transcript of Tax
Return”
A one-page “Compliance Agreement”

In the sixty-eight-page closing packet, the customer is required to sign seventeen
times.
The 138 pages of this typical residential lending application and closing package
contain very important information about what is likely the single largest loan that
the customer will ever take. But honestly, does anyone believe that the typical
customer reads and understands all of this detailed information? Even sophisticated
lawyers are willing to admit that they do not.248 The consumer presented with this
imposing package likely suffers from disclosure fatigue and obtains little benefit.249
Stephanie Dreyer and Peter Weinstock explained the irony of financial
disclosures for consumers:
Perhaps the most ill conceived of the recent waves of regulatory
rulemaking are the many regulations requiring banks to provide
volumes of mind-numbing consumer disclosure. Although promulgated
with the admirable intent of protecting unwary consumers, the
disclosure rules tend to be long on cost and short on clarity. Ultimately,
they are self defeating. . . .
. . . [T]he benefit of the regulation is typically greatest for the higher
educated, those financially able to afford professional advice and the
financially sophisticated who are already well-versed in the issues
addressed by disclosure. Thus the prototypical “naive consumer” for
whom the disclosure is intended to protect, may not receive any

248. It was reported that Judge Richard Posner of the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals
told guests at a 2010 American Constitution Society conference that he did not read the
documentation for his home equity loan, he simply signed the documents presented to him.
Debra Cassens Weiss, Judge Posner Admits He Didn’t Read Boilerplate for Home Equity
Loan, A.B.A. J. (June 23, 2010, 1:37 PM), http://www.abajournal.com/news/article
/judge_posner_admits_he_didnt_read_boilerplate_for_home_equity_loan/.
249. Senator Elizabeth Warren argues that one of the purposes of the CFPB is to “revise
and update outdated regulations and useless disclosures as aggressively as it monitors the
fine print layered on by lenders. If everything is on the table, including existing government
regulations, the goals of transparency and consumer understanding can become a reality.”
Elizabeth Warren, Warren Outlines CFPB’s Mission for Consumers, AM. BANKR. INST. J.,
Apr. 2011, at 10.
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meaningful benefit from the information provided. Yet there is no
doubt that all consumers are paying their share of the cost.250
The residential lending package is a good example of what happens in a
regulatory system developed through accretion. Each of the disclosures contained
in this packet is, individually, a good idea. The Good Faith Estimate form
promulgated by HUD is a particularly consumer-friendly method of
communicating important information about the loan to the consumer. No one can
argue that the Truth-in-Lending Disclosure, the Itemization of Amount Financed,
or the disclosure of alternative settlement providers is a bad idea.251 Consumers
should be aware of the Equal Credit Opportunity Act, the Fair Credit Reporting Act,
anticoercion provisions of state and federal law, the Right to Financial Privacy Act of
1978, the right to receive a copy of an appraisal, the Flood Disaster Protection Act of
1973, RESPA, and the Housing Financial Discrimination Act of 1977. But if it seems
unlikely that consumers will (1) absorb all of this information and (2) use this
information to make better borrowing decisions, then we must consider the cost this
regulatory approach inflicts on banks and, ultimately, consumers.252
Each document in the 138-page packet must be developed or acquired by a
bank. Lawyers and consultants must be retained to ensure that the packet fulfills all
of the bank’s obligations under a myriad of state and federal laws. Bank employees
must prepare these documents for each residential loan. They must process the
documents and establish files to keep copies of the documents. These are not
insignificant costs. Compare the twenty-four documents in the typical residential
closing packet with the documents in a typical closing packet for a multimillion
dollar commercial real-estate loan. At closing, the borrower signs the promissory
note, mortgage, perhaps a guaranty, an assignment of leases and rents, an
environmental indemnity, and a closing statement. That’s six documents.

250. Dreyer & Weinstock, supra note 59, at 100–01.
251. Consumer-protection rules were instituted to remedy real problems. For example,
the Community Reinvestment Act was passed by Congress in 1977 to eliminate the practice
of “redlining” by financial institutions, including small banks.
Redlining refers to the systematic denial of credit to persons in minority or
low-income neighborhoods. . . . In some cases, banks “literally drew red lines
on maps around minority or low-income areas that were to be avoided” by not
opening branch locations and denying loan requests. Often, these red lines were
drawn based on racial considerations instead of economic factors.
Camden C. Betz, Recent Changes to the Community Reinvestment Act and Their Impact on
Community Banks and Rural Economies, 10 N.C. BANKING INST. 157, 160 (2006) (footnote
omitted) (quoting Michael S. Barr, Credit Where It Counts: The Community Reinvestment
Act and Its Critics, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 513, 516 n.5 (2005)).
252. See Dreyer & Weinstock, supra note 59, at 105 (“Compared to other realms of
regulation, no one has demonstrated that federal consumer disclosure regulations deliver
benefits commensurate with their costs. The current system of consumer disclosure comes at
a high expense for banks and their customers. Those regulations act as a drag on economic
growth by misplacing resources . . . . The nature and volume of mandated disclosure
prevents the fulfillment of the purpose of communicating information to enable consumers to
make informed decisions. The system has become self-defeating.”).
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Despite all the well-intentioned efforts of Congress and state legislators to
protect residential borrowers, millions of American borrowers took out loans in the
years leading up to the financial crisis that proved to be imprudent.253 However,
residential mortgage defaults for loans held in portfolio at community banks
between 2003 and 2010 made up only 2% of all residential mortgage defaults,
despite the fact that community banks were responsible for approximately 16% of
residential mortgage loans during that time period.254 Even before Dodd-Frank,
there was a disconnect between the regulation imposed on community banks, the
significant cost ultimately passed on to consumers by virtue of that regulation, and
the minimal risk posed to consumers by community banks.
C. Dodd-Frank and Community Banks
In the summer of 2008, the collapse of the American residential real-estate
market pushed the world’s economy off a cliff. All Americans felt the pain.
Unemployment rates rose. Residential foreclosure rates skyrocketed. Corporate
investment plummeted. The credit markets seized. In the immediate aftermath,
policymakers attempted to understand the causes of the 2008 financial crisis and
quickly “fix” the economy. In the narrative that emerged, greedy investors and
banks, fueled by incentive structures that favored short-term gain over long-term
stability, made risky investments and created exotic financial instruments that they
failed to fully understand.255 These risky activities ensnared “Main Street
America,” according to the narrative, through subprime mortgage lending and
subsequent securitization. When the subprime mortgage origination and
securitization machinery collapsed, it dragged homeowners, investors, and
originators down with it.256 The market confusion immediately following the
failure of Lehman Brothers convinced policymakers that the high concentration of
assets in a very small number of institutions, and their perceived
interconnectedness, meant that the failure of one institution could set off a cascade
of stress and failures throughout the American economy.257 In order to prevent
conflagration across the entire financial industry, the federal government and the

253. See, e.g., Todd Zywicki, The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau: Savior or
Menace?, 81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 856, 900 (2013) (“The architects of the CFPB were correct
that the substantive consumer financial protection rules were suboptimal. For example, the
impenetrable thicket of paperwork surrounding mortgage originations did little to dispel
consumer confusion or protect them from fraud.”)
254. See supra Part I.C.1.
255. See generally ANDREW ROSS SORKIN, TOO BIG TO FAIL (2009).
256. See generally MICHAEL LEWIS, THE BIG SHORT: INSIDE THE DOOMSDAY MACHINE (2010).
257. See H. Rodgin Cohen, Preventing the Fire Next Time: Too Big To Fail, 90 TEX. L.
REV. 1717, 1720 (2012) (“Whatever may have been the actual cause and effect, Lehman’s
failure had a traumatic impact on policymakers with respect to their ensuing decisions. There
was now agreement as to the resolution of the Hobson’s Choice between taxpayer-backed
assistance to financial institutions and the potential of a catastrophic systemic failure in the
absence of such assistance. The risk to the taxpayer and the other issues created by effective
acknowledgment of TBTF were deemed to be outweighed by the risk to the financial system
and the broader economy from a disorderly failure.”).
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American taxpayer stepped in to prop up these “systemically significant”
institutions. While Main Street struggled, so the story goes, the Wall Street banks
that created the crisis were deemed “too big to fail,” lest their failure further
exacerbate the crisis.
This narrative—largely adopted by the Obama administration, the congressional
majority in the 111th Congress, and the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission—
convinced policy makers that the regulatory framework for American banking was
broken and that only government intervention could fix it.258 That intervention
came in January 2010 when Congress passed Dodd-Frank.259 Sponsors explained
that Dodd-Frank was designed to “address the numerous failures that led to the near
collapse of our financial system.”260 Specifically, sponsors highlighted the
following Dodd-Frank regulations261: (a) creation of the Financial Stability
Oversight Council to monitor potential threats to the financial system; (b) provision
for the orderly wind down of systemically significant banks and avoidance of a
repeat of “too big to fail”; (c) robust consumer-protection reform through the
creation of the CFPB; (d) increased transparency for the over-the-counter
derivatives market; and (e) mortgage reform. Drafters intended all of these policies
to correct the perceived “inefficiencies and failures” in the financial system that led
to the 2008 financial crisis.262
As the GAO noted in a September 2012 report, although Dodd-Frank was
primarily aimed at large, systemically important financial institutions, seven of the
Act’s sixteen titles are expected to have an effect on community banks.263 Four years
after Congress passed Dodd-Frank, it remains unclear to what extent these provisions
will impact community banks, due to the Act’s heavy reliance on agency rulemaking.
Dodd-Frank directs federal regulatory agencies to implement the Act’s
provisions through 398 separate rulemaking requirements.264 Some of those

258. Of course, not everyone agrees with this narrative of the financial crisis. See, e.g.,
FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT, supra note 23, at 441 (dissenting statement of Peter J.
Wallison).
259. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No.
111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010).
260. 155 CONG. REC. 30, 816 (2009) (testimony of Rep. Edwin Perlmutter).
261. See COMM. ON BANKING, HOUSING, & URBAN AFFAIRS, U.S. SENATE, BRIEF
SUMMARY OF THE DODD-FRANK WALL STREET REFORM AND CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT
(2010), available at http://www.banking.senate.gov/public/_files/070110_Dodd_Frank_Wall
_Street_Reform_comprehensive_summary_Final.pdf.
262. Although Dodd-Frank itself does not recite a clearly stated goal, the Financial
Stability Oversight Council, the new supercommittee created by the Act, has stated that the
purpose of the Act is to “build a stronger, more resilient financial system—less vulnerable to
crisis, more efficient in allocating financial resources, and less vulnerable to fraud and
abuse.” FIN. STABILITY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL, 2011 ANNUAL REPORT, at i (2011), available at
http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/fsoc/documents/FSOCAR2011.pdf.
263. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-12-881, COMMUNITY BANKS AND
CREDIT UNIONS: IMPACT OF THE DODD-FRANK ACT DEPENDS LARGELY ON FUTURE RULE
MAKINGS 19 (2012) [hereinafter GAO-12-881], available at http://www.gao.gov/assets
/650/648210.pdf.
264. DAVIS POLK & WARDWELL LLP, DODD-FRANK PROGRESS REPORT 2 (2014), available at
http://www.davispolk.com/sites/default/files/October2014_Dodd.Frank_Progress.Report.pdf.
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requirements grant the regulatory agency very limited discretion in terms of
deciding how to implement the relevant provision. But many are discretionary,
either directing agencies to issue regulations that they deem “necessary and
appropriate” or permitting agencies discretion in the substance of the regulation.265
Some of the most significant discretion, for the purposes of this Article, is the
discretion granted to regulatory agencies to determine whether or not a particular
rule should be applied to a set of financial institutions.266 While this language is
fairly standard in regulatory rulemaking, it is significant in the context of
Dodd-Frank for two reasons. First, although the political justification for
Dodd-Frank was to stabilize the financial system and prevent another crisis,
regulators have the power to expand the scope of the Act significantly. Second,
perhaps because of the speed with which the Act was assembled and passed, many
of the provisions have fundamental ambiguities that do not give sufficient guidance
to regulators to craft rules consistent with congressional intent.267
The Durbin Amendment is a good example of the wide discretion granted to
rulemaking agencies. Section 1075 of Dodd-Frank, better known as the Durbin
Amendment, directed the Federal Reserve to adopt rules relating to interchange
fees—the fees paid by merchants to the issuers of debit cards when those cards are
used in a transaction.268 Sarah Bloom Raskin, a governor of the Federal Reserve,
testified before the House Subcommittee on Financial Institutions and Consumer
Credit on February 17, 2011, that there was meaningful uncertainty regarding the
parameters of the proposed rule.269 For example, section 1075 requires the Federal
Reserve to limit interchange fees to a level that is “reasonable” and
“proportional.”270 The Act does not define either of those words. In addition, the
Federal Reserve was directed to determine the “incremental cost” that an issuer
incurs to authorize, clear, and settle a particular transaction in order to help arrive at
a regulatory cap on interchange fees.271 However, Congress did not define
“incremental cost,” and there is no generally accepted definition of the term.

265. See HESTER PEIRCE, INCREASING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE BUREAU OF CONSUMER
FINANCIAL PROTECTION IN PROTECTING CONSUMERS 5 (2014), available at
http://financialservices.house.gov/uploadedfiles/hhrg-113-ba15-wstate-hpeirce-20140521.pdf
(testimony before the Financial Institutions and Consumer Credit Subcommittee of the House
Committee on Financial Services) (“Dodd-Frank’s grant of authority to the Bureau allows the
agency considerable discretion.”).
266. See GAO-12-881, supra note 263, at 6–7.
267. See PEIRCE, supra note 265, at 4 (“An even more troubling practice is the Bureau’s
intentional perpetuation of statutory ambiguities in order to allow further clarification through
enforcement actions. The most notorious example of this is the Bureau’s decision not to define
the unclear jurisdictional term introduced by Dodd-Frank—“abusive” act or practice—and
choosing instead to retain the option of defining it through enforcement actions.”).
268. § 1075, 124 Stat. at 2068.
269. Understanding the Federal Reserve’s Proposed Rule on Interchange Fees:
Implications and Consequences of the Durbin Amendment: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Fin. Insts. and Consumer Credit of the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 112th Cong. 2 (2011)
[hereinafter Raskin Statement] (statement of Sarah Bloom Raskin, Governor, Federal
Reserve System).
270. § 1075(a)(2), 124 Stat. at 2068.
271. Id. at 2069.
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Governor Raskin testified that it “was a little bit hard to translate [that term] into
something workable”272 and that, in general, “there are quite a number of provisions
in this set of directives that have been difficult to interpret.”273 As a result of these
undefined terms, among others, Congress granted the Federal Reserve fairly wide
latitude in its rulemaking to effectuate the Durbin Amendment, without clear
guidance about what Congress hoped to accomplish through the provision.
The stakes are high for the Federal Reserve’s interpretation of “reasonable,”
“proportional,” and “incremental cost,” as well as a range of other issues related to
interchange fees. Community banks rely heavily on interchange fees to offset the
costs of providing free checking accounts. In an attempt to not punish community
banks by limiting such a vital source of income, Dodd-Frank specifically exempts
“small issuers,” those with total assets of less than $10 billion, from the cap on
interchange fees.274 Prior to the adoption of the final rule by the Federal Reserve,
however, community banks were concerned that the creation of a two-tier
interchange-fee system would impose significant hardship on the industry, as it
would incentivize merchants to discourage the use of debit cards from small issuers
with interchange fees higher than the cap applicable to large banks.275 In other
words, the law may have expressly exempted community banks, but basic
economic theory suggests that approach would have been unsuccessful. When
asked about the economic impact of the Durbin Amendment on small banks,
Governor Raskin testified: “Whether or not [small issuers] still are able to make a
profit is going to depend on the market dynamics on how this all looks in the
end.”276 Then, in response to a follow-up question, she continued: “The market
dynamics of these [interchange fees] are really pretty complicated and unclear. So,
it is not exactly perfectly quantifiable regarding what is going to happen . . . .”277
Governor Raskin’s Durbin Amendment testimony illustrates two central
problems with Dodd-Frank and its potential application to community banks. First,
community banks cannot be certain which provisions of Dodd-Frank will apply to
them, given the wide latitude granted to regulators. How the Federal Reserve
defined “incremental cost” had a significant impact on the final rule. Whether a
regulator determines that it is “necessary” or “appropriate” to exempt small
financial institutions from the application of a particular rule is a necessary first
step to assessing the impact of the provision, and one fraught with uncertainty.
Second, community banks cannot predict how the highly regulated environment in

272. Raskin Statement, supra note 269, at 7.
273. Id. at 22.
274. § 1075(a)(2), 124 Stat. at 2070.
275. Letter from Indep. Cmty. Bankers of Am. & Credit Union Nat’l Ass’n to Members
of the U.S. Senate (May 5, 2010), available at http://www.cuna.org/Grassroots-And
-Political-Action/DownLoads/congress_letter_050510a/ (“Splitting up a system that works
because it is currently not bifurcated will place our members and their customers at a
significant disadvantage: with government price controls on debit cards issued by big banks,
no market mechanism will be in place to prevent merchants from discriminating against
consumers who carry the now artificially more expensive debit cards from credit unions and
community banks.” (emphasis in original)).
276. Raskin Statement, supra note 269, at 11.
277. Id. at 27–28.
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which they operate will change as a result of those broad, discretionary rules and
how much those changes may impact their bottom line. That is to say—it is
impossible to quantify how “market dynamics” will be impacted by the
implementation of rules that have not yet been written. As illustrated in the case of
the Durbin Amendment, we are all left to guess how these new rules will affect the
way banks provide financial services and the continued viability of the
community-banking model.
As of October 1, 2014, slightly more than one-half of the 398 rulemaking
requirements in Dodd-Frank had been satisfied with finalized rules.278 Rules have
been proposed to meet an additional 21%, while over 20% of the required
rulemakings have not yet been addressed.279
It is beyond the scope of this Article to comprehensively analyze the complete
impact of the 838-page Dodd-Frank Act on community banks.280 The two
provisions of Dodd-Frank which are most concerning to community banks are Title
X, which created the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, and Title XIV, which
reformed residential lending.
1. Title X: Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection
Title X of Dodd-Frank established the Bureau of Consumer Financial
Protection, now referred to as the CFPB.281 The CFPB has been granted broad
powers to “regulate the offering and provision of consumer financial products or
services.”282 The limit to those powers, and how those powers may be implemented
to impact community banks, remains uncertain and represents the most significant
risk to the operations of community banks as a result of Dodd-Frank. Although the
Act specifically exempts financial institutions with total assets of less than $10
billion from direct examinations by the CFPB, it does not exempt smaller
institutions from other rules.283
One of the most troubling provisions in Title X is Section 1026, which states
that the CFPB may “require reports . . . as necessary” to support its mission.284 It is
impossible for community banks to quantify the impact of a rule that permits a
regulatory agency to require reports whose content and scope is unknown. In
addition, the CFPB is authorized to collect additional data from all financial

278. DAVIS POLK & WARDWELL LLP, supra note 264, at 2.
279. Id.
280. For a more comprehensive analysis, see MARSH & NORMAN, supra note 72.
281. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No.
111-203, § 1011, 124 Stat. 1376, 1964 (2010).
282. § 1011(a), 124 Stat. at 1964. Section 1022 transferred existing rulemaking authority
to the CFPB.
283. Michael J. Aiello & Heath P. Tarbert, Bank M&A in the Wake of Dodd-Frank, 127
BANKING L.J. 909, 917 (2010) (“Although community banks and regional institutions with
assets of less than $10 billion will avoid primary supervision by the CFPB, the new agency’s
substantive rules will nonetheless govern all financial institutions. Because small banks
generally focus more heavily on consumers than the large money-center banks, they likely
will be disproportionately affected.”).
284. § 1026(b), 124 Stat. at 1993.
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institutions related to small businesses and residential mortgages.285 Some of the
relevant data is described in the Act, but the CFPB is permitted to require the
disclosure of additional information that it deems necessary or appropriate.
Section 1031 grants the CFPB broad authority to define and prevent “unfair,
deceptive, or abusive acts or practices.”286 This section should benefit consumers
and community banks by regulating previously unregulated entities like payday
lenders. However, John Adams has expressed concerns that although the terms
“unfair” and “deceptive” are “well-understood by market participants” because
they are used in section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act to prohibit “unfair
or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce,” the term “abusive” is new
and undefined.287 Section 1031(d) provides that an act or practice is abusive if it:
(1) materially interferes with the ability of a consumer to understand a
term or condition of a consumer financial product or service; or (2)
takes unreasonable advantage of—(A) a lack of understanding on the
part of the consumer of the material risks, costs, or conditions of the
product or service; (B) the inability of the consumer to protect the
interests of the consumer in selecting or using a consumer financial
product or service; or (C) the reasonable reliance by the consumer on a
covered person to act in the interests of the consumer.288
Adams is concerned that
[i]nterpreting section 1031(d)(2) broadly, a community banker selling a
consumer financial product to a customer may be acting in an
“abusive” fashion if he does not recognize that the customer has not
understood the “material, risks, costs, or conditions of the product or
service[;]” cannot protect his or her own interests; or has reasonably
relied on the community bank to act in his best interest. Banks have
never before been required to evaluate the legality of a transaction on
the basis of subjective criteria. However, section 1031(d)(2) appears to
impose this very obligation.289
The CFPB will likely also play a powerful role in establishing a baseline of
standardized disclosures, practices, and products that will be perceived by other

285. See, e.g., § 1071, 124 Stat. at 2056 (requiring lenders to collect and report
small-business loan data); § 1094, 124 Stat. at 2097 (amending the Home Mortgage
Disclosure Act to require lenders to collect and report an applicant’s credit score); see also
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-14-758, CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION
BUREAU: SOME PRIVACY AND SECURITY PROCEDURES FOR DATA COLLECTIONS SHOULD
CONTINUE BEING ENHANCED (2014), available at http://www.gao.gov/assets/670/666000.pdf
(“To carry out its statutory responsibilities, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau
(CFPB) has collected consumer financial data on credit card accounts, mortgage loans, and
other products through one-time or ongoing collections.”).
286. § 1031(b), 124 Stat. at 2005–06.
287. John T. Adams, Consumer Financial Protection and Community Banks, 35 U. ARK.
LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 227, 239 (2013) (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (2006)).
288. § 1031(d), 124 Stat. at 2006.
289. Adams, supra note 287, at 240 (alterations in original) (footnotes omitted).
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regulators and by the market as protective of consumers. For example, the CFPB
has, through its construction of the qualified-mortgage regulations, signaled that it
believes that consumers will benefit from standardized financial products.290 Of
course, using residential mortgage lending as an example, the idea that data-driven,
fit-a-borrower-in-a-box lending is inherently safer and more beneficial to the
consumer than personalized underwriting and customized loan products inherently
values the business model of the large banks over the relationship-banking model
of community banks. Not only does that reasoning fly in the face of the incentives
and business practices that the authors of Dodd-Frank believe caused the collapse
of the residential real-estate market, but it places millions of Americans at risk of
being denied traditional banking services and being forced to rely on high-cost,
alternative financial-service providers or losing access to services entirely. Many
Americans simply do not fit neatly in a box but may still reasonably be judged to
be good credit risks by a lender with a fuller picture of the individual borrower and
the local economy.291
The admirable goal of the CFPB is to protect consumers. During the run-up to
the 2008 financial crisis, many consumers were the victims of predatory lending
and other abusive practices. But community banks have not been accused of
participating in those practices. Instead, their business model depends upon
establishing long-term relationships with customers and the community. Imagine
the typical small bank in a rural community. If it began taking advantage of its
customers, word would spread quickly, and it would soon be out of business. Even
if the CFPB is necessary or advisable to protect consumers from large financial
institutions and nonbank financial-service providers, the authors of Dodd-Frank
have not made the case that it is necessary to expand the compliance burden on
community banks by subjecting them to the wide-ranging authority of the CFPB.
2. Title XIV: Mortgage Reform and Anti-Predatory Lending Act
Community banks did not engage in subprime lending. The key concern about
Title XIV is that community banks may be forced to change their operations or
incur increased costs that will place them at a competitive disadvantage with larger
financial institutions.
The most significant provision in Title XIV is Subtitle B (“Minimum Standards
for Mortgages”), section 1411 (“Ability to repay”).292 This fairly remarkable
provision prohibits lenders from making a residential mortgage loan unless the
lender can sufficiently document, at the time the loan is made, that the borrower has
a “reasonable ability to repay the loan.”293 This intention of the provision is clear.
As CFPB Director Richard Cordray wrote:
In the run-up to the financial crisis, we had a housing market that
was reckless about lending money. Lenders thought they could make

290. See Zywicki, supra note 253, at 917–23.
291. The uncertainty posed by the new “abusive” standard may also spur standardization
by “increas[ing] the risks of offering customized products.” Adams, supra note 287, at 241.
292. § 1411, 124 Stat. at 2142.
293. Id.
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money on a loan even if the consumer could not pay back that loan,
either by banking on rising housing prices or by off-loading the
mortgage into the secondary market. This encouraged broad
indifference to the ability of many consumers to repay loans, which
dramatically increased mortgage delinquencies and rates of
foreclosures.294
While Cordray’s statements may have been true with respect to the subprime
loans originated and sold into the secondary market, community banks lend on a
different model, as substantiated by the drastically lower default rates that they
have experienced.295 Far fewer community-bank residential mortgage loans are
sold. The standard practice of community banks is to make loans and keep those
loans on their books until maturity or earlier repayment. The banks bear the risk
that their underwriting was insufficient—that a borrower lacks the ability to repay a
loan. In other words, again, the business model of community banks precludes
them from participating in the sins that Title XIV is intended to prevent. Despite
that, this provision raises the stakes for community banks. In addition to bearing the
risk that a borrower might default, if a lender cannot adequately document that the
borrower had the ability to repay as of the time of disbursal, the lender is in
violation of the Truth in Lending Act and subject to a lawsuit by the borrower as
well as a defense to foreclosure.296
Section 1412 of Dodd-Frank attempts to mitigate this harsh remedy by
providing a safe harbor. The core of Section 1412 is the definition of “qualified
mortgage”—lenders will be deemed not to have violated their obligations under the
ability-to-repay rules if the mortgage meets the definition of a qualified
mortgage.297 In January 2013, the CFPB issued the final rule defining this key term.
The final rule requires lenders to consider and verify eight factors when processing
a loan application: (1) current or reasonably expected income or assets; (2) current
employment status; (3) monthly payment on the covered transaction; (4) monthly
payment on any simultaneous loan; (5) monthly payment for mortgage-related
obligations; (6) current debt obligations, alimony, and child support; (7) monthly
debt-to-income ratio; and (8) credit history.298 The rule includes additional
guidance on how lenders should interpret and weigh each factor.
The “qualified mortgage” term is new to financial regulation, and the
consequences for failing to understand, implement, or document the eight factors
are high. Again, community banks largely lack the in-house expertise to protect

294. Richard Cordray, CFPB, Assuring Consumers Have Access to Mortgages They Can
Trust, CONSUMERFINANCE.GOV (Jan. 10, 2013) http://www.consumerfinance.gov/blog
/assuring-consumers-have-access-to-mortgages-they-can-trust/.
295. See supra Part I.C.1.
296. A violation of TILA gives rise to liability for statutory damages, including actual
damages incurred by the debtor plus a civil penalty. 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a)(1)–(2)(A)(i) (2012).
A violation of TILA may also permit a borrower to rescind a loan, including a rescission of
the security interest that the lender has in the borrower’s principal residence. 15 U.S.C.
§ 1635(a) (2012). The borrower may also have the right to equitable modification under
§ 1635(b).
297. § 1412, 124 Stat. at 2145.
298. 12 C.F.R. § 1026.43 (2014).
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themselves from mistakes that could lead to costly litigation. Beyond changing
their processes for originating and underwriting residential mortgages, they will
likely be compelled to hire additional compliance staff or outside consultants. On
July 15, 2014, the Independent Community Bankers of America and a number of
other organizations representing community banks wrote to Richard Cordray,
urging the CFPB to revise the ability-to-repay / qualified mortgage rules “to allow
community bank loans held in portfolio for the life of the loan to receive automatic
[qualified-mortgage] safe harbor status and an exemption from the escrow
requirements if the loans are higher priced.”299 The letter reiterated that the purpose
of the qualified mortgage rule was to prevent predatory lending and that market
forces already protected the customers of community banks:
Community banks operate under a completely different business
model than that of the larger financial institutions and mortgage
companies. They underwrite based on firsthand knowledge of their
customers and communities, and thrive on the strength of their
reputations. As such, community banks have every incentive to make
fair, safe, and affordable loans.
. . . Therefore, additional underwriting and escrow requirements
only function as unnecessary regulatory burdens that stifle community
banks’ ability to provide solid loan products to consumers so they can
achieve the American dream of home ownership. This reality seems
inconsistent with the CFPB’s mission which is “to make markets for
consumer financial products and services work for Americans.”300
III. REFORMING THE REGULATION OF COMMUNITY BANKS
Community banks barely resemble their “too-big-to-fail” cousins. Yet under our
“one-size-fits-all” regulatory framework, they are subject to the same rules and
procedures.
The authors of Dodd-Frank were correct that the framework for regulating
American financial institutions is broken. However, by adding rules of
wide-ranging application to a framework that treats all federally chartered banks
the same, regardless of size or complexity, Dodd-Frank undermines its key goals.
This Part examines two specific impacts of Dodd-Frank on community banks:
increased compliance costs and increased standardization. The proper response to these
impacts, however, is not so straightforward as repealing a single piece of legislation, no
matter how sweeping it was. Community banks need deeper and more meaningful
reform to erase the explicit and implicit subsidies—and resulting competitive
advantages—that the current system awards to large, complex financial institutions.
If we accept the narrative of the 2008 financial crisis put forth by the authors of
Dodd-Frank, then it is clear that the problems that led to the crisis did not involve
community banks. The twin goals of Dodd-Frank are to ensure the stability of the
financial system and to protect consumers. Neither goal requires the application of

299. Letter from Cmty. Banking Orgs. to Richard Cordray, Dir., CFPB 1 (July 15, 2014),
available at http://www.icba.org/files/ICBASites/PDFs/cl071514.pdf.
300. Id.
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this remedial legislation to community banks. First, community banks are, by
definition, too small on an individual basis to destabilize the financial system.
Second, the business model employed by community banks has proven to
sufficiently protect consumers. Community banks have far different incentives in
underwriting solid loans than do mortgage originators like Countrywide. Their
success depends upon the repayment of the loans on their books and the goodwill
and loyalty of their customers.
Despite the lack of political or policy justification for doing so, Dodd-Frank, the
most comprehensive reform of the American financial system since the Great
Depression, will impact community banks. The vital question is—how? Two years
after passage of Dodd-Frank, too much remains unknown to precisely quantify its
effect. Of course, that lack of information is the chief challenge facing community
bankers—they must plan for a future in which the rules are largely unknown.301
The most likely impacts of Dodd-Frank are twofold. First, community banks
will incur significant compliance costs that will place them at a further competitive
disadvantage as compared with large banks. The number of community banks will
continue to shrink, through failure and merger, leading to increased consolidation
and continued growth of the “too-big-to-fail” banks. Second, the influence of the
CFPB and its baseline assumption that increased standardization will benefit
consumers will continue to undermine the customization of the community banking
model. Neither of these outcomes will fulfill the purposes of Dodd-Frank, namely,
to promote systemic stability and consumer protection.
A. Compliance Costs and Consolidation
Community bankers have repeatedly expressed concern that Dodd-Frank will
impose new and costly regulatory-compliance burdens on community banks. Both
the GAO and FDIC, in reports released in September 2012 and December 2012,
respectively, 302 concluded that it is impossible at this time to quantify the costs that
community banks will incur as a result of Dodd-Frank. This problem is due to two
main factors.
First, there is considerable uncertainty regarding the content of roughly half of
the rules mandated by the Act.303 As previously discussed, community banks
cannot quantify the impact of rules if they do not know whether those rules will
apply to them or how the rules will affect their operations.304
Second, the integration of regulatory compliance activities into normal bank
operations complicates data gathering to establish a baseline of regulatory
compliance costs before Dodd-Frank. This means that while it may be possible for
banks to quantify existing direct compliance costs (e.g., compliance staff,
continuing education, dedicated software, etc.), it would be costly and difficult for
banks to attempt to quantify existing indirect compliance costs, such as the time

301. Texas Community Banks Hearing, supra note 107, at 13–14 (statement of Ignacio
Urrabazo, Jr., President, Commerce Bank, Laredo, Texas) (“Community bankers are
frustrated with the unknown . . . .”).
302. See GAO-12-881, supra note 263; FDIC COMMUNITY BANKING STUDY, supra note 20.
303. See supra notes 278–79 and accompanying text.
304. See supra note 301 and accompanying text.
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spent by noncompliance personnel on compliance-related tasks. The smaller banks
will likely find it even harder to separate out those costs due to small staffs with
overlapping duties. Banks do not routinely document their direct compliance costs;
those costs are not regularly tracked in call reports, and they have not been studied
in recent years. Of course, this lack of information poses a catch-22. It is difficult
for community banks to make the case that their compliance costs are too high
without data on those costs. At the same time, it would place a burden on
community banks to obtain that data.
A 2013 Economic Policy Paper from the Federal Reserve Bank in Minneapolis
attempted to quantify the cost of the increased regulatory burden.305 It did so by
“modeling the impact of new regulatory costs as the hiring of additional staff,
resulting in higher total compensation and lower profitability.”306 The analysis
concluded that
the impact on profitability is most significant for the smallest
institutions. The median bank with assets below $50 million would
experience a drop in [return on assets] of nearly 23 basis points, while
the median firms in the larger size cohorts would encounter a decline of
11 basis points or less.307
As a result:
Nearly 60 percent of the total number of banks that would become
unprofitable due to the regulatory change are in the smallest cohort
using data from 2012. Moreover, 13 percent of the banks with assets
less than $50 million would become unprofitable, compared with
roughly 2 percent or less of the other size groups.308
There is evidence that before Dodd-Frank, compliance costs imposed a
significant burden on community banks. A 2004 study concluded that “the cost of
complying with just 13 federal regulations was approximately $3.2 billion, or
roughly 24 percent of banks’ income before taxes.”309 Anecdotal information
confirms that compliance costs at small banks have significantly increased in recent
years. For example, the president of Commerce Bank, a $550 million community
bank in Texas, told a congressional subcommittee that his regulatory compliance
budget is $10 to $12 million per year.310 He testified that four to five years ago, his
bank had “maybe 7” people in compliance. In 2012, that number had ballooned to

305. RON FELDMAN, KEN HEINECKE & JASON SCHMIDT, FED. RESERVE BANK OF MINNEAPOLIS,
QUANTIFYING THE COSTS OF ADDITIONAL REGULATION ON COMMUNITY BANKS (2013), available
at https://www.minneapolisfed.org/pubs/eppapers/13-3/epp_13-3_community_banks.pdf.
306. Id. at 1.
307. Id. at 6.
308. Id. at 8.
309. Dreyer & Weinstock, supra note 59, at 100 (citing Cutting Through the Red Tape:
Regulatory Relief for America’s Community Based Banks: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Fin. Insts. & Consumer Credit of the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 108th Cong. 32 (2004)).
310. Texas Community Banks Hearing, supra note 107, at 22 (testimony of Ignacio
Urrabazo, Jr., President, Commerce Bank, Laredo, Texas).
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48.311 The president of a $177 million, thirty-seven-employee, minority-owned
community bank in El Paso testified at the same hearing that the percentage of his
bank’s employees who were directly involved in compliance had increased from
10% to 25% over the same period.312
The president of an eighty-year-old, $150 million community bank located in Fort
Stockton, Texas (population 8000), and Sanderson, Texas (population 750), testified
that during the eleven years that he had been with the bank, the lending staff had not
increased, “[b]ut during that same time period, we have had to add two employees
simply to handle government regulation. And if I have to double that staff due to
Frank-Dodd [sic], that will constitute 10 percent of my entire staff.”313
Although they are largely unable to quantify the expected costs, community
banks are focused on the rules contemplated by Dodd-Frank, particularly with
respect to the data gathering and reporting mandated by the CFPB314 and new
requirements for underwriting residential mortgages.315 All of these provisions are
complex, and the stakes for failure to understand and follow them are high. The
chief executive of a small North Carolina institution summarized the impact: “For a
little bank like ours with 19 people, [it] could be a full-time job for somebody to
make sure we comply with the provisions of [Dodd-Frank].”316
Community banks, particularly small institutions located in rural areas, may
have difficulty recruiting and retaining qualified compliance officers. As one
community bank executive testified to a congressional subcommittee:
I personally know of two community banks that simply threw in the
towel and sold out after being beat up by regulators about not having
enough high power talent in their compliance position, a position they
tried fervently to fill but were unable to attract someone of that caliber
to relocate to their rural community.317
Even though the most significant regulations yet to be promulgated under
Dodd-Frank have not become effective, a handful of community banks have
announced that rather than incur the costs necessary to comply with the new
rules—costs that would make their products more expensive for their customers—
they will simply abandon lines of business implicated by the Act. Jim Purcell, the
chairman and chief executive of State National Bank of Big Spring, Texas, a
community bank with $300 million in assets, stated that his institution has stopped

311. Id.
312. Id. (testimony of Lester Leonidas Parker, Chairman, President, and Chief Executive
Officer, United Bank of El Paso Del Norte, El Paso, Texas).
313. Id. at 6–7 (statement of George H. Hansard, President and CEO, The Pecos County
State Bank, Fort Stockton, Texas).
314. See Hester Peirce, Ian Robinson & Thomas Stratmann, How Are Small Banks
Faring Under Dodd-Frank? 46–48 (George Mason Univ. Mercatus Ctr., Working Paper No.
14-05, 2014).
315. Id. at 49–52.
316. On the Record, supra note 28.
317. Texas Community Banks Hearing, supra note 107 (statement of Cliff McCauley,
Senior Executive Vice President, Frost Bank, San Antonio, Texas).
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extending residential mortgage loans because of the increased costs.318 In particular,
he cited the cost of the information technology that would have been necessary for his
institution to establish and manage the escrow accounts required by section 1461 of
the Act.319 “[It] makes no economic sense for us,” Mr. Purcell said.320
Community bankers have consistently expressed concern about the creeping
regulatory-compliance burden.321 Greg Ohlendorf, president of the $150 million
First Community Bank and Trust in Beecher, Illinois, put the new Dodd-Frank
compliance costs in perspective:
What we have to understand is we’re already overburdened with
regulation. We have significant numbers of regs that we need to comply
with today, and it seems like just one more isn’t going to change the
deck a whole lot, but the consistent piling on of additional regulation is
very, very stunning. It’s punishing.322
The president of a $150 million community bank in Texas illustrated the
cumulative impact of decades of regulation:
Several months ago, we at Pecos County State Bank stumbled across
our bank’s policy manual from 1986. That policy manual was 100
pages long. Today, our same policy manual is over 1,000 pages, which
requires a full-time compliance officer and also a real estate clerk to
remain abreast of regulatory changes to ensure that we remain in
compliance . . . .323
Finally, Lester Leonidas Parker, president of the $177 million United Bank of El
Paso Del Norte, El Paso, Texas, quantified the costs already incurred:
We are a simple, non-complex organization, yet the direct compliance
costs in the bank have increased 240% over the past five years far
exceeding the growth of the bank, its loans, investments or deposits.
That compliance cost figure includes only the direct cost of specific

318. John Adams, Dodd-Frank Rules Are IT-Cost Prohibitive for Some Banks, AM.
BANKER (January 14, 2013, 3:34 PM), http://www.americanbanker.com/issues/178_10/for
-some-lenders-new-rules-are-it-cost-prohibitive-1055840-1.html.
319. Id.
320. Id.
321. Regulatory Reform Hearing, supra note 74 app. at 59 (prepared statement of Marty
Reinhart, President, Heritage Bank, Spencer, Wisconsin) (“[W]ith regulatory and paperwork
requirements, both new and old, there continues to be a disproportionate burden placed on
community banks due to their more limited resources, diminishing their profitability and
ability to attract capital and support their customers, including small businesses.”); Dreyer &
Weinstock, supra note 59, at 104 (“Although the cost of compliance is significant for all banks,
it weighs heaviest on smaller, community banks. Smaller, community banks do not benefit
from the economies of scale enjoyed by their larger counterparts. Without the resources of
larger institutions, smaller banks are likely to be overwhelmed.” (footnotes omitted)).
322. On the Record, supra note 28.
323. Texas Community Banks Hearing, supra note 107, at 6 (statement of George H.
Hansard, President and CEO, The Pecos County State Bank, Fort Stockton, Texas).
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managers while working on regulatory compliance, the new cost of a
skilled compliance officer, and the cost of myriad outside, third-party
auditors and reviewers to ensure that our compliance efforts are
adequate. It does not count the other costs of implementation, the
annual training that I must do with all employees and the compliance
activities that they have throughout each week.324
The rising costs of regulatory compliance put a more significant relative burden
on community banks than their larger cousins.325 For example, JPMorgan Chase
estimates that its cost to comply with Dodd-Frank will be approximately $3 billion
over the next few years.326 In comparison, JPMorgan Chase lost $6.25 billion in
2012 from losses incurred by a single credit-derivative trader known as the
“London Whale.”327 Jamie Dimon referred to that loss as a “sideshow” and a
“complete tempest in a teapot.”328 Despite the loss, JPMorgan Chase posted a
record net income in 2012 of $21.3 billion on total revenues of $99.9 billion.329
While the regulatory costs associated with Dodd-Frank will annoy the large
banks, they will constitute a blip on the balance sheet. They will have a far greater
impact on community banks. There is evidence that smaller banks are
disproportionately affected by the costs of regulatory compliance.330 A 1998 study
by Federal Reserve staff found evidence that smaller banks are at a cost
disadvantage compared to larger banks.331 That cost disadvantage will intensify
with further investments in compliance staff, technology, lawyers, and consultants.

324. Id. at 12–13 (statement of Lester Leonidas Parker, Chairman, President, and Chief
Executive Officer, United Bank of El Paso Del Norte, El Paso, Texas).
325. Regulatory Reform Hearing, supra note 74, at 14 (statement of Patricia Wesenberg,
President and Chief Executive Officer, Central City Credit Union) (“For a large financial
institution, the compliance costs, even if large, are just a very small slice of their total costs.
For smaller institutions . . . they represent a huge increase in relative costs.”).
326. Letter from Jamie Dimon, Chairman & Chief Executive Officer, JPMorgan Chase,
to JPMorgan Chase Shareholders 17 (Mar. 30, 2012), available at http://online.wsj.com
/public/resources/documents/dimon.pdf.
327. Jessica Silver-Greenberg, Mortgage Lending Helps JPMorgan Profit Rise 34%,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 13, 2012, at B1.
328. Polya Lesova, Dimon: London Whale Issues “Tempest in a Teapot,”
MARKETWATCH (Apr. 13, 2012, 9:37 AM), http://www.marketwatch.com/story/dimon
-london-whale-issues-tempest-in-a-teapot-2012-04-13-937450.
329. Press Release, JPMorgan Chase & Co., JPMorgan Chase Reports Fourth-Quarter
2012 Net Income of $5.7 Billion, or $1.39 Per Share, on Revenue of $24.4 Billion (Jan. 16,
2013), available at http://files.shareholder.com/downloads/ONE/3462396563x0x628657
/e9bf2070-50c9-4a9d-a842-4f45812989fe/JPM_4Q12_EPR_FINAL.pdf.
330. Zywicki, supra note 253, at 885 (“It is well established that certain types of
regulatory compliance costs, such as paperwork and other oversight costs, are largely
invariant to the size or output of a firm, and thus fall proportionately harder on smaller firms
in an industry. It is unsurprising, therefore, that community banks and credit unions have
expressed grave concerns about Dodd-Frank’s and the CFPB’s punishing regulatory
compliance costs.” (footnote omitted)).
331. Gregory Elliehausen, The Cost of Banking Regulation: A Review of the Evidence,
FED. RES. BOARD STAFF STUD., Apr. 1998, at 1, available at http://www.federalreserve.gov
/pubs/staffstudies/1990-99/ss171.pdf.
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Of special concern, regulatory “start-up costs” such as “learning the requirements
of a regulation, reviewing and redesigning credit applications, changing data
processing systems, and revising credit evaluation models” impose a more
significant relative burden on smaller banks due to economies of scale.332 “As a
result, smaller banks face higher average regulator [sic] compliance costs than
larger banks, especially in connection with these start-up activities.”333
B. Standardization
A recurring theme in Dodd-Frank, particularly with respect to the CFPB, is that
the standardization of financial products and forms will protect consumers. This is
implicitly a reaction to the narrative that one of the causes of the 2008 financial
crisis was the inability of parties to understand and appreciate the risks of
innovative financial products.334 But the focus on standardization of consumer
financial products, like home loans and checking accounts, fails to recognize the
value to consumers of the community-banking model, which emphasizes
relationship banking, personalized underwriting, and customization of financial
products to meet the specific needs of customers and communities.335 One of the
chief advantages of community banks is their ability to successfully lend to borrowers
who are “informationally opaque” because they do not have the deep credit history
necessary for the model-based lending used by large financial institutions.336
If regulators push the entire financial-services industry in lockstep towards
standardization—of underwriting, financial products, and applications—then many
small businesses and individuals currently served by the community-bank model
may be denied credit.337 Esther George, president and CEO of the Federal Reserve
Bank of Kansas City, expressed concern in 2012:

332. Adams, supra note 287, at 242 (citing Elliehausen, supra note 331, at 16–19).
333. Id.
334. See Zywicki, supra note 253, at 901 (“Elizabeth Warren has pined for a return to a
supposed golden age of simple consumer credit products and has argued that the only reason
for increased complexity in credit card agreements is to create ‘tricks and traps’ for
consumers. Yet nearly everything consumers purchase is too complex for them to understand
all the details, features, and dangers of those purchases—whether the product is a car,
computer, or medical service. Yet it would be absurd to argue that the only reason that
sellers have replaced typewriters with computers is because computers are more complex
and bewildering than typewriters, thereby enabling computer sellers to trick and harm
consumers more easily by selling them computers when consumers would prefer
typewriters. . . . Thus, while simplification is a useful goal, it cannot be a transcendent goal
in itself—at least not without considering functionality and the role of consumer choice.”
(emphasis in original) (footnote omitted)).
335. See supra Part I.B.
336. See supra text accompanying note 163.
337. See Wilmarth, supra note 57, at 39 (“Cost factors appear to be the primary reason
for the relative lack of interest among big banks in providing credit to small firms. Compared
with syndicated loans to large corporate borrowers, it is much more costly (on a per-loan
dollar basis) for big banks to make loans to small businesses whose creditworthiness cannot
be evaluated according to fixed numerical standards such as net worth, liquidity, and
debt-to-equity ratios. Senior managers of large banks are typically responsible for overseeing
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[T]he Consumer Financial Protection Bureau will be rewriting many of
the key regulations related to mortgage lending.
This approach of specifying how residential mortgage loans should
be structured and underwritten will undoubtedly leave community
bankers with far less flexibility and authority to tailor such lending to
the characteristics of their communities and customers. . . . [I]t is not
uncommon to hear community bankers say that they may be forced to
cut back substantially on their home lending activities or even eliminate
them entirely. Such unintended consequences are costly and impede
mortgage lending at a time when housing markets are weak.338
In addition, due to their higher operating costs relative to larger banks based on
economies of scale, if community banks are forced through standardization into
small versions of large financial institutions, they will be at a severe competitive
disadvantage.339
C. Four Modest Proposals for Regulatory Reform
The purpose of this Article is not to argue that repealing Dodd-Frank would
benefit community banks. Dodd-Frank is impacting and will continue to impact
community banks by increasing their compliance costs and promoting
standardization that undermines the relationship-banking model. But the regulatory
problem facing community banks is much bigger than Dodd-Frank. To save
community banks, more radical action is required.340
many lines of business and broad geographical areas. It is, therefore, more difficult and
expensive for those managers (compared with community bank executives) to ensure that
loan officers properly evaluate and monitor small firm borrowers. In addition, a large bank
generally experiences (through rotation, promotion, and attrition) a frequent turnover of its
lending personnel at any particular branch. In contrast, community bank loan officers are
usually long-term residents of the bank’s home community and therefore are more familiar
with the small businesses in that community.”).
338. George, supra note 104, at 6.
339. Zywicki, supra note 253, at 885–56 (“[S]maller banks compete by providing more
personalized services, such as designing products specifically tailored to individual needs.
Dodd-Frank and the CFPB, however, push toward making consumer credit more like a
standardized commodity rather than permitting banks to tailor their consumer credit products
to the needs of particular borrowers.”); Letter from Craig G. Blunden, Chairman, President
& CEO, Provident Sav. Bank, David A Bochnowski, Chairman & CEO, Peoples Bank,
Thomas L. Hoy, Chairman, President & CEO, Arrow Fin. Corp., Robert R. Jones, III,
President & CEO, United Bank, Robert V. Macklin, President & CEO, The Milford Bank
& Julieann M. Thurlow, President & CEO, Reading Co-operative Bank, to Timothy F.
Geithner, Sec’y of the Treasury, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, at 2 (Aug. 18, 2009), available
at http://www.aba.com/aba/pdf/gr/CFPA_Geithner_081809.pdf (“Commoditization, contrary
to the administration’s assertions, will favor large institutions with economies of scale and
larger advertising budgets.”).
340. Without the additional burdens imposed by misregulation, community banks face
“factors and circumstances” that
argue against the long-term success of community banks: excessive
concentration of risk in lending; competitive pressures from deregulation and
new technologies; and limitations on market power, brand recognition, and
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The basic principle that should inform any efforts to regulate the American
banking sector is that community banks are different from large, complex financial
institutions and that the hazards posed by each to prudential risk, consumers, and
systemic risk are fundamentally different. With this principle in mind, I endorse
four major reforms.
1. Narrow Banking
Congress should adopt a narrow-banking regulatory approach that would tightly
limit the activities banks can engage in. A number of scholars have endorsed
narrow-banking proposals.341 Essentially, narrow banking means creating a
two-tiered system of bank regulation that would restrict traditional banking
organizations to traditional activities like deposit taking, lending, fiduciary
services, and other activities that are “closely related” to banking. The large,
complex financial institutions would be required to spin off their traditional
banking units or segregate them from their other financial activities.
This approach would have a number of benefits for community banks. It would
reduce the size of too-big-to-fail or, in Dodd-Frank parlance, systemically
important financial institutions (SIFIs) by reducing the “[too-big-to-fail] subsidies”
provided by joining investment banks with depository institutions.342 Scholars have
noted that large, complex financial institutions have pursued “aggressive growth
strategies” since the 1999 Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act in order to reach a size at
which they would be considered to be too big to fail.343 They have been motivated
both by explicit safety-net subsidies, including federal deposit insurance and access
to the Federal Reserve’s liquidity assistance, and their “implicit [too-big-to-fail]
subsidy by using lower-cost funds to finance high-risk activities.”344 Advocates of
narrow banking argue that large, complex financial institutions have been
exploiting federal deposit insurance for years by using the “regulatory canopy to
undertake more complex and dangerous innovations.”345 As the 2008 financial
crisis demonstrated, this “proliferation of financial products increased risks
substantially. Futures and swaps were used not just to hedge risks, but increasingly
to take large bets with little money down.”346 As Amar Bhidé argues, “Without
technological investment. Their size presumably prevents smaller banks from
adequately diversifying credit risk and prevents management from investing
sufficiently in new technologies to compete effectively.
Hein et al., supra note 90, at 16–17 (footnote omitted).
341. See Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., Narrow Banking: An Overdue Reform That Could Solve
the Too-Big-To-Fail Problem and Align US and UK Financial Regulation of Financial
Conglomerates (pt. 1), BANKING & FIN. SERVICES POL’Y REP., Mar. 2012, at 1 [hereinafter
Wilmarth, Narrow Banking]; Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., Narrow Banking: An Overdue Reform
That Could Solve the Too-Big-To-Fail Problem and Align US and UK Financial Regulation
of Financial Conglomerates (pt. 2), BANKING & FIN. SERVICES POL’Y REP., Apr. 2012, at 1;
Wilmarth, supra note 57, at 77–88.
342. Wilmarth, Narrow Banking, supra note 341, at 1.
343. Id. at 5.
344. Id.
345. Amar Bhidé, In Praise of More Primitive Finance, ECONOMISTS’ VOICE, Feb.
2009, at 1, 3.
346. Id. at 4.
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deposit insurance—and the reassurance of state supervision—most depositors, even
sophisticated ones, would shun banks that traded futures. Paltry passbook rates
simply wouldn’t compensate for the risks.”347
Community banks face many hurdles when attempting to compete with large,
complex financial institutions. Larger banks benefit from economies of scale.
Transactional banking is more efficient and cost effective than relationship
banking. These are market realities. Regulation that is not appropriately aligned to
systemic and consumer risk should not increase the competitive advantage that
large banks have over small banks. The “implicit subsidy” of “too big to fail” has
been confirmed by a recent study that concluded that “investors do not price the
true, intrinsic ability of a [big] bank to repay its debts, but instead price implicit
government support for the bank.”348 The authors of the study also concluded that
“[t]he passage of Dodd-Frank in the summer of 2010 did not significantly alter
investors’ expectations of government support.”349 Although the authors of
Dodd-Frank made it very clear that the federal government will not bail out SIFIs
in the future, the market is equally clear that it does not believe this to be true.350
The best way to eliminate the implicit too-big-to-fail subsidy is to adopt a
regulatory approach that separates traditional banks.
2. Limit Standardization
As the description of the typical residential real-estate loan package in Part II.B
illustrated, there is already significant standardization of the documentation used in
consumer loans. The promissory note and mortgage are on forms created by Fannie
Mae and/or Freddie Mac. The settlement statement and good-faith estimate are
provided on forms developed by HUD. It is likely that the CFPB will promulgate
additional standard disclosure forms to be used in residential real-estate lending.
In other words, a move toward standardization of financial products has been
developing for decades. But the regulators who create these forms, in particular the
CFPB, should take care that they do not ultimately undermine consumers and their
access to credit by undermining the relationship-banking model.
3. Revisit Dual Banking
America has a unique and inefficient dual-banking system in part because
Alexander Hamilton and Thomas Jefferson could not agree on whether banks
should be chartered by the states or the federal government.351 More than two

347. Id. at 3.
348. Wilmarth, Narrow Banking, supra note 341, at 4 (alteration in original); see also
Viral V. Acharya, Deniz Anginer & A. Joseph Warburton, The End of Market Discipline?
Investor Expectations of Implicit Government Guarantees (June 2014) (unpublished
manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1961656.
349. Acharya et al., supra note 348, at 29.
350. In fact, as Professor Arthur E. Wilmarth has noted, “Dodd-Frank does not
completely shut the door to future government bailouts for creditors of SIFIs.” Wilmarth,
Narrow Banking, supra note 341, at 1–2.
351. See supra notes 208–10 and accompanying text.
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centuries later, that tension remains, but we should ask whether there is continued
benefit to this compromise system. Critics contend that the “dual banking system is
an illusion” that is “both expensive and useless.”352 The federal government
regulates the safety and soundness of state-chartered banks through the FDIC,
preempts state consumer-protection laws, and regulates systemic risk through the
Federal Reserve. In light of this level of federal activity, what meaningful role is
left for state government?353
We should also ask whether the continued regulatory cost is worth it. Felsenfeld
and Bilali argue that eliminating the dual-banking system would result in streamlined
and less costly regulation: “Bankers complain regularly about the unnecessary
complexity of the regulatory system but do not seem to appreciate that turning the socalled dual system into a single regulatory approach to banking can yield obvious
simplifications the price for which has already been spent.”354 Felsenfeld and Bilali
also concede that “fierce resistance” could be expected from the “state banking
authorities (and perhaps the national authority too).”355 At the very least, we should
go further than Dodd-Frank in terms of achieving uniformity of primary supervisors
and ensuring a consistent approach in supervision and examination.
4. Revisit Consumer-Protection Laws
Although consumer-protection laws are well intentioned and address real
problems, we should evaluate whether those laws need to be uniformly applied to all
banks and whether the laws as they currently exist do more than cause “disclosure
fatigue.” There is little evidence that community bankers engage in predatory lending
or other anticonsumer practices. Community banks depend on the goodwill of their
customers and their continued good reputation in their communities. In other words,
market forces do much to protect the customers of community banks. It is certainly
arguable that market forces do more to protect the customers of community banks
than a 168-page residential real-estate lending packet does. With this in mind, we
should ask whether there should be safe harbors from certain reporting and disclosure
requirements for community banks below a certain size.
We should also question whether consumer protection belongs in the province
of federal or state law. One observer argued that federal preemption of state
consumer-protection laws before the 2008 financial crisis created a “race to the
bottom,” which permitted the predatory lending and abusive practices in subprime
lending.356 This pattern of preemption continued in Section 1044 of Dodd-Frank.357
Federal rather than state consumer-protection statutes favor large banks, which
need consistency for their interstate operations, over small banks, which generally
operate in a single state.

352. Felsenfeld & Bilali, supra note 207, at 80.
353. See Butler & Macey, supra note 231, at 680 (“[U]nder the current FDIC insurance
system, there is no legitimate role for state regulation of bank activities.”).
354. Felsenfeld & Bilali, supra note 207, at 79.
355. Id.
356. Danyeale L. Hensley, Section 1044 of Dodd-Frank: When Will State Laws Be
Preempted Under the OCC’s Revised Regulations?, 16 N.C. BANKING INST. 161, 162 (2012).
357. Id.
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CONCLUSION
The purpose of Dodd-Frank was to protect consumers and the stability of the
financial system. Community banks provide vital services to millions of
Americans, many of whom would be underserved if the community-bank model
were broken or if community banks were to abandon lines of service.
If the patterns of consolidation continue and community banks are forced to
merge, consolidate, or go out of business because of the cumulative regulatory
burden, one result will be an even greater concentration of assets on the books of
the “too-big-to-fail” banks. Another result will be that small businesses and
individuals who do not fit neatly into standardized financial modeling, or who live
outside of metropolitan areas served by larger banks, will find it more difficult to
obtain credit. Neither of these outcomes will protect consumers, the financial
system, or the recovery of the American economy.
More broadly, Dodd-Frank exacerbates the broken model of American financial
regulation that fails to differentiate between small banks engaged in traditional
relationship banking and modern, complex financial-services firms. Meaningful
reform of the financial regulatory system, reform that would actually reduce
systemic risk and protect consumers, would establish a two-tiered regulatory
framework. Community banks operating on the traditional model would be subject
to less stringent regulation and examination. This is appropriate because the
success of their business model depends on the quality of their underwriting and
their long-term relationships with repeat customers. Freed of unnecessary
regulatory burden, and allowed by examiners to engage in true relationship banking
without fear of criticism, community banks would be better able to serve their
customers. The largest financial institutions would be subject to regulations and
examinations appropriate to their size, complexity, and role in the American
economy. The unique challenges that they pose to the stability of the financial
system could be more appropriately and efficiently addressed by the staff of
existing regulatory agencies if the burden on community banks were lessened.
None of the proposed reforms would be easily accomplished. Indeed, it is
quixotic to even suggest most of them. But they would have a significant and
beneficial impact on community banks and could go a long way toward protecting
the relationship-banking model and reversing the trend of asset consolidation in a
small number of large, complex financial institutions.

